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The paper analyses the determinants of long-term economic performance of east 
European and CIS economies in two periods: 1960-1989 (the era of central planning) 
and 1990-2005 (the transition to the market economy system). Throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s economic growth in eastern Europe progressively weakened and during the 
1980s most of these economies plunged into a prolonged stagnation or recession, which 
contributed to the collapse of communism and central planning. The transition from 
plan to market began with the transformational recession, which persisted until the mid-
1990s in eastern Europe, but was longer and deeper in the CIS. Since then, the east 
European and CIS economies have embarked on a path of strong economic growth. The 
recovery has been accompanied by a surge in fixed investment, often complemented by 
large inflows of FDI. Despite robust output growth, however, there has not been – at 
least so far – a noteworthy recovery in employment. The main feature of the recent 
strong economic growth in the region has been a remarkable upturn in both labour 
productivity and total factor productivity. The considerable gains in productive 
efficiency and rapid technological change were triggered by wide-ranging market 
reforms and the modernization of the capital stock. Gains in aggregate output per 
person employed have outpaced by a large margin increases in real GDP per capita.  In 
terms of average productivity and real per capita income levels relative to those of the 
more developed, industrialized countries, the east European and CIS economies still 
face a long catching up process. 
I. Introduction 
Analysing long-run economic growth in a turbulent region as that of eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a challenging research problem. The twentieth century 
was marked by deep turmoil and far-reaching changes in this part of the world, including revolutions 
and wars, transformation in political and social order, and frequent redrawing of national borders. The 
period addressed in this study (from 1960 onwards) witnessed the rise of communism in eastern 
Europe and its peak in the Soviet Union (in the first postwar decades), its gradual decay in the 1970s 
and 1980s and finally its fall and the transition to democracy and market economy after 1989.  
There are a number of difficulties that need to be addressed in this context. The first one is the 
absence of reliable economic output statistics for the period of central planning. The official growth 
statistics were systematically biased upwards due to the poor quality of the statistical data and deliberate 
distortions introduced by the authorities in an attempt to present a more favourable picture of the state of 
the economy. The second one is related to the major changes in the geographical landscape of Europe 
after 1989: the existing nine postwar countries with centrally planned economies (including the Soviet 
Union) were broken up into 27 successor states: 15 in eastern Europe and 12 in the CIS, while one (the 
German Democratic Republic) ceased existing as a country. In terms of long-term trends these are 
“natural” points of structural break: discussing long-term trends covering the whole period for entities 
that did not exist throughout this period is methodologically questionable. Besides, in most new (or re-
established) states, historical statistical series of economic performance simply do not exist, and in the 
few where they have been compiled retrospectively they only cover a very short period or refer to 
different national boundaries. 
This study attempts to address some of these problems and proposes possible ways of coping with 
the related difficulties. In order to deal with the structural break related to the fall of communism, we 
offer a sequential chain of two stories: one related to the period of central planning (1960-1989) and 
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another one dealing with the period of transition to market economy (from 1989 to date). The 
methodological problems related to the adequate measurement of economic growth in the centrally 
planned economies (CPEs) are also addressed in the first part of the study. But due to the still 
questionable quality of the available data this part does not go into much detail and just provides a 
broad-brush picture of the long-run developments. The second part of the study is devoted to economic 
growth after the start of political and economic transformation. One of the achievements in this period 
– among numerous others – has been the remarkable improvement of the quality of statistical data. 
Thus we not only look at the aggregate trends but also make an attempt to analyse some of the main 
factors of economic growth in the east European and CIS economies. 
One of the central policy goals of the economic transformation in the former CPEs was to bring 
about a better resource allocation and, related to that, greater efficiency in the use of resources. The 
more advanced reforming countries in the region have already made notable progress in this direction. 
The initially strong popular support for radical reforms in these countries reflected the hope that 
incomes and living standards would rise fairly quickly to levels similar to those prevailing in the 
developed market economies of western Europe. Catching up, by definition, requires sustained 
stronger growth of per capita incomes than in the more advanced region/country by a sufficiently large 
margin for a given time horizon.   Given the existing large real income gaps, this catching-up process 
will only be possible in the medium and long term and will require that the east European and CIS 
economies achieve sustained improvement in factor productivity and productive efficiency.  
II.  Economic growth in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 1960-1990 
A.  Economic growth in the centrally planned economies: methodological and 
measurement issues 
There are numerous methodological and practical problems surrounding the actual data that are 
used in the measurement and analysis of long-term growth performance. Long-run rates of economic 
growth are a theoretical abstraction and their information content does not necessarily relate to the 
current growth performance of a country. Nevertheless, the long-run rate of growth is a useful concept 
as it sets the economic dynamics of a country in a specific and unique perspective. However, assessing 
these trends requires consistent long-term data series on aggregate output performance. 
Large data sets of comparable real income level data and covering a sufficiently large number of 
countries over long periods of time have started to be compiled only recently.
1 Despite continuing 
efforts, the quality of data is in general far from satisfactory, a fact which weakens the conclusions that 
can be drawn from them. These data problems are especially acute with respect to eastern Europe and 
the CIS region, even abstracting from the difficulties related to changes in geographic borders.  
The quality of past statistical data referring to the period of central planning imposes serious 
limitations on the analysis of long-run economic growth. During the 1970s and, especially, in the 
1980s it was becoming increasingly obvious to most observers and analysts that the performance of the 
former CPEs was progressively weakening despite the desperate efforts of politicians and technocrats. 
Most independent analysts tend to believe that the last two decades of communism in eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union were generally a period of prolonged stagnation (or of deep recession in 
the case of Poland, because of the debt crisis of the 1980s), when living standards fell even further 
behind those in the western industrialized countries. However, the true picture of these developments 
                                                   
1  The most widely used data for this type of analysis are the so-called Penn World Tables (PWT) which contain comparable 
per capita GDP data for more than 130 countries from 1950. R. Summers and A. Heston, “A new set of international 
comparisons of real product and price level estimates for 130 countries, 1950-1985,” The Review of Income and Wealth, 
Series 34, No. 1, March 1988, pp. 1-25 and “The Penn World Tables (Mark 5): an extended set of international 
comparisons, 1950-1985”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, No. 2, May 1991, pp. 327-368. Another widely 
used set of data that cover a smaller number of (mostly industrialized) countries but for a longer period of time is available 
in A. Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992, Development Centre Studies (Paris, OECD, 1995). 3 
was distorted in most of the former centrally planned countries by the official statistics through which 
the authorities tried to conceal or minimize the fact of the relative decline of their economies. 
Despite numerous efforts by outside observers and analysts to construct alternative measures of 
output growth in the former CPEs (discussed below), there is still a lack of reliable long time series of 
output in central and eastern Europe and the CIS. Consequently, there has been relatively little 
research on their long-term growth trends. The starting point of the analysis is thus a critical 
assessment of the available estimates of the long-term growth rates of these countries.  
The present level of understanding of economic growth in the former centrally planned economies 
during the decades of the command economy still remains unsatisfactory. It is widely acknowledged that 
the official statistics of that period did not reflect accurately actual economic growth and, as such, do not 
provide a sound basis either for comparisons over time or across countries. As a rule the official growth 
statistics were systematically biased upwards, reflecting both the poor quality of the statistical data, and 
the deliberate distortions introduced by the authorities in an attempt to present a more rosy picture of the 
state of the economy. In particular, since inflation was for a long time an ideological taboo in many of 
these countries, the reported real data often contained an upward bias due to the “underestimated” 
inflation. Other difficulties are related to the statistical methodology of the past: the statistics of the 
former CPEs were based on the Material Product Balance System (MPS), which was not directly 
comparable to the System of National Accounts (SNA) used in the western market economies. Moreover, 
even within the MPS system, economic statistics were often rendered meaningless by highly distorted 
relative prices. Finally, cross-country comparisons require internationally comparable national data which 
are not only statistically consistent but are also expressed in the same numeraire.
2 The absence of market 
exchange rates in the planned economies was a major impediment not only to the direct conversion of 
national statistical data into internationally comparable denominations but also to the implementation of 
other approaches, such as those based on purchasing power parities (PPPs). 
One of the practical problems related to the use of alternative estimates made in the past for the 
assessment of long-term trends is that they were usually point estimates, reflecting outcomes for a 
given year or years. This is understandable, given the high cost of such exercises. However, while the 
results of such efforts were helpful for comparisons in a given period they were not sufficient for 
analysing the longer-term growth performance of these economies. 
Computing new, alternative estimates of past economic activity would obviously be a very 
ambitious task, which is in any case beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, this section revisits the set 
of previously compiled estimates in an attempt to reconstitute a more general picture of the past 
performance of CPEs of eastern Europe and the USSR. In addition, an attempt has been made to use 
the scattered point estimates in order to generate estimates for longer time periods on the basis of 
extrapolation and other statistical manipulations. 
Past estimates of alternative, internationally comparable GDP figures for the former CPEs have 
been based on a number of approaches, the most common being:
3 
•  Calculation of purchasing power parities for groups of countries 
This is probably the most soundly-based approach which – despite the inevitable caveats – in 
principle yields international comparisons that are widely accepted. However, it is data and resource 
demanding and usually requires the direct involvement of national statistical offices.
4 Due to resource 
                                                   
2  Per capita GDP levels expressed in “international” dollars have become the standard operational indicator of most 
international comparisons. 
3  For a critical assessment of the approaches used to compose internationally comparable estimates of income levels of the 
former CPEs and a summary of some of their results see E. Lancieri, “Dollar GNP estimates for central and eastern 
Europe 1970-90: a survey and a comparison with western countries”, World Development, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1993, pp. 161-
175. 
4  The Statistics Division of the United Nations has initiated the most comprehensive international PPP-based studies. The 
International Comparison Project (ICP) was launched in 1968 but its practical implementation started at the end of the 
1970s. 4 
constraints and, often, politically motivated reluctance of some CPEs to participate in these 
international comparisons, such studies have only been made for some benchmark years. Indeed, only 
a few of the former CPEs were involved in the early rounds of the studies undertaken within the 
United Nations system.
5 
•  Use of physical indicators (PI) as a basis for computing internationally comparable GDP levels 
The underpinning of this method is the observation (supported by considerable empirical 
evidence) that there exists a strong statistical association between the level of aggregate output 
(GDP) and the level of output of certain key products. This relationship can be estimated on the 
basis of data for countries with reliable statistics (sample of market economies where both types 
of data are available). The reported output data, measured in physical units, for a selection of 
key products in a country with unreliable GDP statistics are then used to estimate an alternative 
value for the level of GDP, which corresponds to the output of such products in that country. 
This method assumes that the reported physical quantities of output, relatively well recorded by the 
statistical offices of the former CPEs, were not subject (or, at least, not to the same degree) to the 
distortions mentioned above.
6 The PI method was employed extensively by the UNECE secretariat for 
the calculation of internationally comparable GDP estimates for the former CPEs.
7  
•  Re-evaluation of national accounts 
The idea behind this approach is to introduce adjustments directly into the national accounts data 
reported by the statistical offices of the former CPEs. It aims to eliminate, or at least sufficiently 
reduce, the inherent distortions in the basic data by, for example, converting MPS into SNA, making 
proper deflation, imposing different price structures, etc.). In a second step – to make the results 
internationally comparable – the “adjusted” data are converted into dollars by applying conversion 
factors emulating market exchange rates. 
The best-known piece of research that relies on this approach (which – if properly followed – is 
even more resource demanding than the calculation of PPPs) is that of Paul Marer.
8 This work, 
however, contains only one benchmark estimate for 1980. Reportedly, the GDP estimates for the 
former CPEs published in the Handbook of Economic Statistics of the United States CIA are based on 
a similar approach.
9 
•  Hybrid approaches, combining elements of the above (or similar) methods 
A typical hybrid approach is that of Robert Summers and Alan Heston to compute “PPP-
compatible” GDP estimates for those former CPEs for which PPP-based figures were not directly 
available. They start with the PPP-based GDP estimates for a control group of countries in order to 
compute a cross-country structural relationship between the PPP of a country and its exchange rate. 
                                                   
5  The first European Comparison Programme (ECP) within the ICP covered 17 European countries and provided 
benchmark estimates for 1980 (Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia participated in this exercise). Four more rounds of the 
ECP have been implemented since then providing benchmarks for 1985, 1990, 1993 and 1996, and covering an increasing 
number of countries. The 1996 round comprised 52 countries, including most of the ECE transition economies. UNECE, 
Economic Bulletin for Europe, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1980 and International Comparisons of Gross Domestic Product in 
Europe,  1985, 1990, 1993, 1996 (United Nations publications, Sales Nos. E.88.II.E.28, E.94.II.E.23, E.97.II.E.2, 
E.99.II.E.13). 
6  Despite its sound rationale, this method still tends to yield a systematic upward bias in the estimates. The reasons for this 
include: the fact that it does not take into consideration quality differences; the implicit assumption (which obviously does 
not hold in reality) of identical productive efficiency in the former CPEs and in market economies (since the statistical 
coefficients that were applied to project GDP levels for the former CPEs were estimated on the basis of data for market 
economies); the implicit assumption of identical price structures; etc. 
7  Three phases of this study were carried out, producing GDP estimates for selected benchmark years. UNECE, Economic 
Bulletin for Europe, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1980; UNECE, Comparative GDP Levels, Physical Indicators, Phase III, 1993 
(United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.93.0.5). 
8 P.  Marer,  Dollar GNPs of the USSR and Eastern Europe (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1986). 
9  A. Maddison, “Measuring the performance of a communist command economy: an assessment of the CIA estimates for 
the USSR”, The Review of Income and Wealth, Series 44, No. 3, September 1998, pp. 307-323 and E. Lancieri, op. cit. 5 
This relation is then used to compute methodologically compatible PPPs – and hence GDP estimates – 
for countries for which only regular national accounts data (or even a proxy for them) are available.
10 
The comprehensive study of long-term economic development by Angus Maddison (which includes 
GDP estimates for some central and east European countries) is based on a similar methodology.
11 
B.  The empirical evidence 
Table 1 summarizes alternative estimates of per capita GDP levels for the former CPEs (relative 
to the corresponding per capita GDP level in the United States) for the period 1960-1990.
12 These 
estimates are the result of large research projects based on different methodologies and made at 
different times. Although probably not exhaustive, the table includes some of the best known and most 
widely used results, which can be regarded as representative of the main strands of research in this 
field. 
One striking feature of the pre-transition figures presented in table 1 is the large dispersion in the 
alternative estimates of the GDP level in the former CPEs. Indeed, large discrepancies – resulting from 
different methodologies – are present even for countries such as Hungary that were considered to have 
had relatively more reliable statistics. These discrepancies illustrate the considerable difficulties of 
analysing long-term growth trends in these countries. 
Another problem is the partial character of the estimates: with the exception of the Maddison data 
set (which contains continuous annual time series for the postwar period), practically all the other 
projects have been limited to selected benchmark years. Even when more than one benchmark is 
available, the period covered is in general quite short. 
An attempt has been made to cope with these difficulties by grouping the available estimates and 
manipulating the source data so as to compile sets of benchmark estimates for the whole period 1950-
1990 with an acceptable degree of internal consistency. Some selected results of this exercise are 
shown in table 2, where per capita income levels in the former CPEs are shown relative to that of the 
United States. The simplest statistical manipulation is the computation of simple averages of all the 
available estimates for a given benchmark year (“estimate A”). The Maddison data, where available, 
are left unchanged (“estimate C”). Some of the estimates (such as the PI estimates but also some of the 
PWT ones) are widely considered to be upward biased. To counter this, a selection of more 
“conservative” estimates has been made, the average of which is shown as “estimate D”; the missing 
data points in this latter estimate have been extrapolated on the basis of the average measured distance 
from other estimates in other benchmark years. “Estimate B” is the weighted average of all the 
available estimates, with a larger weight being given to the more conservative estimates. “Estimate E” 
is a backward extrapolation based on the results of the European Comparison Programme of 1996 
(ECP’96) using the officially reported growth rates in the period since 1989.
13 
Given the nature of the source data and the subsequent statistical manipulation, the results shown 
in table 2 can only be regarded as rough and tentative. Moreover, the ambiguity arising from the 
multiplicity of results does not allow any ranking of the different estimates according to reliability. The 
four long-term series in table 2 (from A to D) reflect different degrees of “conservatism” and hence 
define lower and upper bounds for the absolute levels of per capita GDP in the former CPEs.  
                                                   
10  R. Summers and A. Heston, “Improved international comparisons of real product and its composition: 1950-1980”, The 
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 30, No. 2, 1984, pp. 207-262 and “The Penn World Tables (Mark 5): an extended 
set of international comparisons, 1950-1985”, op. cit. 
11 A.  Maddison,  Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992, op. cit. 
12 For more details see chapter 5, “Catching up and falling behind: economic convergence in Europe”, in UNECE, 
Economic Survey of Europe, 2000 No. 1 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.00.II.E.12), pp. 155-188. 
13 UNECE,  International Comparisons of Gross Domestic Product in Europe, 1996 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 
E.99.II.E.13). ECP’96 provides a benchmark PPP-based estimate of GDP in 1996 for almost all ECE transition 
economies: the only ones not present are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia.  6 
TABLE 1 
Per capita GDP in the former centrally planned economies relative to the United States: summary of available estimates, 1960-1990 
(Per capita GDP in the United States=100) 
  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1989  1990 
Albania          
European  Comparison  Programme  .......................... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
ECP'96  .................................................................. .. .. .. .. .. ..  12.2  10.8 
Physical  indicators  ................................................ ..  .. 15.2 16.8 16.1 15.1  ..  .. 
Penn World Tables ............................................... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Maddison ............................................................... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
World  Bank  ............................................................ .. ..  12.2 .. .. ..  6.6 .. 
Marer  ..................................................................... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
PlanEcon  ............................................................... .. .. .. .. .. ..  6.0  5.8 
WEFA  .................................................................... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
CIA  ........................................................................ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Alton  ...................................................................... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Fischer-Sahay ....................................................... .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  2.9 
Bulgaria          
European  Comparison  Programme  ........................ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
ECP'96  .................................................................. .. .. .. .. .. ..  23.7  22.1 
Physical  indicators  ................................................ 27.7 36.0 35.2 40.2 41.2 43.0  ..  .. 
Penn World Tables ............................................... 31.8  36.3 41.3 47.1 43.0 40.8  ..  .. 
Maddison ............................................................... 26.0  29.0 32.1 36.1 32.7 30.7 28.0 25.9 
World  Bank  ............................................................ .. .. ..  28.8  36.5 ..  23.5 .. 
Marer  ..................................................................... .. .. .. ..  31.3 .. .. .. 
PlanEcon  ............................................................... ..  ..  ..  .. 31.1 28.9 27.3 25.0 
WEFA  .................................................................... .. .. .. .. ..  30.2 ..  25.5 
CIA  ........................................................................ ..  .. 36.9 42.6 39.3 38.7 38.0  .. 
Alton  ...................................................................... .. .. .. ..  29.9 .. ..  24.3 
Fischer-Sahay ....................................................... .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  26.5 
Czechoslovakia          
European  Comparison  Programme  ........................ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
ECP'96  .................................................................. .. .. .. .. .. ..  44.5  43.7 
Physical  indicators  ................................................ 50.8 55.6 48.6 54.9 54.9 52.3  ..  .. 
Penn World Tables ............................................... 61.4  56.6 60.7 64.6 61.4 59.2  ..  .. 
Maddison ............................................................... 45.6  41.7 43.5 45.7 43.3 41.1 39.3 38.0 
World  Bank  ............................................................ ..  .. 45.2 49.3 51.2  .. 38.8  .. 
Marer  ..................................................................... .. .. .. ..  41.7 .. .. .. 
PlanEcon  ............................................................... ..  ..  ..  .. 41.6 39.7 38.2 37.8 
WEFA  .................................................................... .. .. .. .. ..  39.5 ..  35.8 
CIA  ........................................................................ ..  .. 51.0 55.0 52.7 52.5 51.3  .. 
Alton  ...................................................................... .. .. .. ..  40.3 .. ..  36.3 
Fischer-Sahay ....................................................... .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  36.0 
German Democratic Republic           
European  Comparison  Programme  ........................ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
ECP'96  .................................................................. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Physical  indicators  ................................................ 57.0 60.5 51.0 59.2 60.1 57.9  ..  .. 
Penn World Tables ............................................... 57.9  57.8 61.8 69.0 69.2 69.7  ..  .. 
Maddison ............................................................... 31.7  32.6 37.3 38.6 40.0 38.7 38.6  .. 
World  Bank  ............................................................ .. ..  50.5  53.3  63.2 .. .. .. 
Marer  ..................................................................... .. .. .. ..  52.0 .. .. .. 
PlanEcon  ............................................................... ..  ..  ..  .. 47.9 48.0 46.3 39.1 
WEFA  .................................................................... .. .. .. .. ..  50.7 ..  42.6 
CIA  ........................................................................ ..  .. 53.5 60.6 61.1 62.9 63.1  .. 
Alton  ...................................................................... .. .. .. ..  46.4 .. ..  48.1 
Fischer-Sahay  ....................................................... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Hungary          
European  Comparison  Programme  ........................ ..  ..  ..  .. 38.2 33.3  .. 28.0 
ECP'96  .................................................................. .. .. .. .. .. ..  38.9  37.6 
Physical  indicators  ................................................ 33.4 38.9 39.3 43.4 45.6 43.8  ..  .. 
Penn World Tables ............................................... 43.7  44.4 46.4 49.9 48.3 46.0  ..  .. 
Maddison ............................................................... 32.6  33.3 33.8 35.9 34.2 32.3 30.6 28.5 
World  Bank  ............................................................ ..  .. 32.4 34.6 36.8  .. 32.0  .. 
Marer  ..................................................................... .. .. .. ..  38.6 .. .. .. 
PlanEcon  ............................................................... ..  ..  ..  .. 32.8 31.2 29.2 27.2 
WEFA  .................................................................... .. .. .. .. ..  37.5 ..  31.5 
CIA  ........................................................................ ..  .. 43.0 46.9 45.5 45.1 43.8  .. 
Alton  ...................................................................... .. .. .. ..  34.1 .. ..  28.0 
Fischer-Sahay ....................................................... .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  28.1 
(For source and notes see end of table.) 7 
TABLE 1 (concluded) 
Per capita GDP in the former centrally planned economies relative to the United States: summary of available estimates, 1960-1990 
(Per capita GDP in the United States=100) 
  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1989  1990 
Poland          
European  Comparison  Programme  ........................ ..  ..  ..  .. 35.6 26.2  .. 22.5 
ECP'96  .................................................................. .. .. .. .. .. ..  26.1  21.9 
Physical  indicators  ................................................ 34.2 38.7 34.7 39.0 38.9 34.0  ..  .. 
Penn World Tables ............................................... 38.4  38.2 41.2 50.4 43.9 39.2  ..  .. 
Maddison ............................................................... 28.8  28.4 29.8 35.9 31.1 27.9 25.6 23.0 
World  Bank  ............................................................ ..  .. 28.4 35.5 34.3  .. 24.2  .. 
Marer  ..................................................................... .. .. .. ..  32.8 .. .. .. 
PlanEcon  ............................................................... ..  ..  ..  .. 27.1 24.4 21.9 18.0 
WEFA  .................................................................... .. .. .. .. ..  28.4 ..  23.4 
CIA  ........................................................................ ..  .. 38.3 47.4 41.9 38.8 36.8  .. 
Alton  ...................................................................... .. .. .. ..  27.5 .. ..  19.9 
Fischer-Sahay ....................................................... .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  26.3 
Romania          
European  Comparison  Programme  ........................ .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  15.3 
ECP'96  .................................................................. .. .. .. .. .. ..  26.9  25.3 
Physical  indicators  ................................................ 22.1 29.1 26.4 31.7 33.8 30.2  ..  .. 
Penn World Tables ............................................... 23.2  24.9 27.2 33.5 34.6 34.1  ..  .. 
Maddison ............................................................... 16.5  18.0 19.2 23.3 22.4 20.3 17.5 15.5 
World  Bank  ............................................................ ..  .. 18.8 16.9 20.6  .. 16.3  .. 
Marer  ..................................................................... .. .. .. ..  23.6 .. .. .. 
PlanEcon  ............................................................... ..  ..  ..  .. 19.4 18.1 16.5 13.6 
WEFA  .................................................................... .. .. .. .. ..  22.8 ..  16.9 
CIA  ........................................................................ ..  .. 25.3 31.5 32.6 32.7 27.8  .. 
Alton  ...................................................................... .. .. .. ..  26.9 .. ..  18.2 
Fischer-Sahay ....................................................... .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  16.3 
SFR of Yugoslavia           
European  Comparison  Programme  ........................ ..  ..  ..  .. 33.3 31.2  .. 24.1 
ECP'96  .................................................................. .. .. .. .. .. ..  31.0  27.8 
Physical  indicators  ................................................ 23.0 28.3 26.8 32.9 34.3 30.4  ..  .. 
Penn World Tables ............................................... 24.2  26.1 30.6 36.3 41.5 40.4  ..  .. 
Maddison ............................................................... 21.5  22.7 24.6 29.0 31.9 29.8 26.7 24.5 
World  Bank  ............................................................ ..  .. 13.2 18.8 23.1  .. 31.0  .. 
Marer  ..................................................................... .. .. .. ..  23.1 .. .. .. 
PlanEcon  ............................................................... ..  ..  ..  .. 31.1 28.9 27.3 25.0 
WEFA  .................................................................... .. .. .. .. ..  21.0 ..  17.1 
CIA  ........................................................................ ..  .. 27.7 31.2 35.1 33.4 33.0  .. 
Alton  ...................................................................... .. .. .. ..  32.8 .. ..  23.9 
Fischer-Sahay  ....................................................... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Soviet Union           
European  Comparison  Programme  ........................ .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  30.4 
ECP'96  .................................................................. .. .. .. .. .. ..  33.7  32.4 
Physical  indicators  ................................................ 37.2 43.7 39.6 42.6 42.6 40.0  ..  .. 
Penn World Tables ............................................... 40.1  41.1 47.4 51.0 49.3 50.0  ..  .. 
Maddison ............................................................... 35.2  34.9 37.5 37.9 34.9 33.1 31.9 30.9 
World  Bank  ............................................................ ..  .. 36.3 34.8 40.1  .. 30.3  .. 
Marer  ..................................................................... .. .. .. ..  36.9 .. .. .. 
PlanEcon  ............................................................... ..  ..  ..  .. 30.9 29.1 26.1 23.7 
WEFA  .................................................................... .. .. .. .. ..  35.4 ..  32.0 
CIA  ........................................................................ 37.6 39.1 42.8 48.5 46.3 44.0 44.2  .. 
Alton  ...................................................................... .. .. .. ..  48.1 .. ..  41.9 
Fischer-Sahay ....................................................... .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  22.3 
Source:  European Comparison Programme: UNECE, Economic Bulletin for Europe, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1980 and International Comparisons of Gross Domestic 
Product in Europe, 1985, 1990 (United Nations publications, Sales Nos. E.88.II.E.28, E.94.II.E.23); ECP'96: UNECE, International Comparisons of Gross Domestic 
Product in Europe, 1996 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.99.II.E.13); Physical indicators: UNECE, Economic Bulletin for Europe, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1980; 
UNECE, Comparative GDP Levels, Physical Indicators, Phase III, 1993 (United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.93.0.5); Penn World Tables: R. Summers 
and A. Heston, "Improved international comparisons of real product and its composition: 1950-1980", The Review of Income and Wealth, Series 30, No. 2, 1984, 
pp. 207-262; "A new set of international comparisons of real product and price level estimates for 130 countries, 1950-1985", The Review of Income and Wealth, 
Series 34, No. 1, 1988, pp. 1-25; and "The Penn World Tables (Mark 5): an extended set of international comparisons, 1950-1985", The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 106, No. 2, May 1991, pp. 327-368; Maddison: A. Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992, Development Centre Studies (Paris, 
OECD, 1995); World Bank: E. Lancieri, "Dollar GNP estimates for central and eastern Europe 1970-90: a survey and a comparison with western countries", World 
Development, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1993, pp. 161-175; M. de Melo, C. Denzier, A. Gelb and S. Tenev, Circumstances and Choice: The Role of Initial Conditions and 
Policies in Transition Economies, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 1866 (Washington, D.C.), December 1997; Marer: P. Marer, Dollar GNPs of the 
USSR and Eastern Europe (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1986); PlanEcon: J. Vanous (ed.), "How big are the Soviet and east European 
economies?", PlanEcon Report, Vol. 6, No. 52 (New York), December 1990; WEFA: The WEFA Group, World Economic Outlook 1991 (Washington, D.C.), 1991; 
CIA and Alton: Handbook of Economic Statistics, as quoted in UNECE, Comparative GDP Levels …, op. cit. ; Fischer-Sahay: S. Fischer and R. Sahay, "The 
transition economies after ten years", paper presented at the conference Ten Years After: Transition and Growth in Post-communist Countries (Warsaw), 15-16 
October 1999. 8 
       As a following step, the estimated benchmark levels of per capita GDP measured in international 
1990 dollar prices and 1990 PPPs were used to compute the implied average annual rates of growth of 
GDP and GDP per capita in the former CPEs during the period 1960-1990. These results, broken down 
by subperiods, are presented in tables 3 and 4, respectively (for the four estimates, from A to D). For 
TABLE 2 
Per capita GDP in the former centrally planned economies and their successor states relative to the United States: averages of 
various estimates, 1960-1990 
(Per capita GDP in the United States =100) 
  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1989  1990 
Albania          
A.  Simple average of all estimates ...................................  ..  .. 13.7 16.8 16.1 15.1  8.3  6.5 
B.  Weighted average of various estimates .......................  .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
C.  Maddison data .............................................................  .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
D.  Extrapolation of conservative estimates ......................  .. .. .. .. .. ..  9.1  6.5 
E.  ECP'96 .........................................................................  .. .. .. .. .. ..  12.2  10.8 
Bulgaria          
A.  Simple average of all estimates ...................................  28.5 33.8 36.4 39.0 35.6 35.4 28.1 24.9 
B.  Weighted average of various estimates .......................  24.6 30.0 31.7 36.2 34.7 34.9 29.3 28.6 
C.  Maddison data .............................................................  26.0 29.0 32.1 36.1 32.7 30.7 28.0 25.9 
D.  Extrapolation of conservative estimates ......................  21.3 25.9 27.3 31.2 30.5 29.6 25.5 24.7 
E.  ECP'96 .........................................................................  .. .. .. .. .. ..  23.7  22.1 
Czechoslovakia           
A.  Simple average of all estimates ...................................  52.6 51.3 49.8 53.9 48.4 47.4 42.4 37.9 
B.  Weighted average of various estimates .......................  46.3 46.3 45.1 49.3 47.1 46.9 46.6 44.3 
C.  Maddison data .............................................................  45.6 41.7 43.5 45.7 43.3 41.1 39.3 38.0 
D.  Extrapolation of conservative estimates ......................  39.7 39.7 38.7 42.2 41.0 39.6 41.4 37.9 
E.  ECP'96 .........................................................................  .. .. .. .. .. ..  44.5  43.7 
German Democratic Republic           
A.  Simple average of all estimates ...................................  48.9 50.3 50.8 56.1 55.0 54.7 49.3 43.3 
B.  Weighted average of various estimates .......................  49.5 51.0 48.6 55.3 54.4 56.4 53.2 49.7 
C.  Maddison data .............................................................  31.7 32.6 37.3 38.6 40.0 38.7 38.6  .. 
D.  Extrapolation of conservative estimates ......................  43.2 44.4 42.4 48.2 47.2 49.4 46.3 43.3 
E.  ECP'96 .........................................................................  .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Hungary          
A.  Simple average of all estimates ...................................  36.6 38.9 39.0 42.1 39.3 38.5 34.9 29.9 
B.  Weighted average of various estimates .......................  33.1 35.8 36.8 40.1 39.3 39.5 37.8 34.3 
C.  Maddison data .............................................................  32.6 33.3 33.8 35.9 34.2 32.3 30.6 28.5 
D.  Extrapolation of conservative estimates ......................  29.0 31.3 32.2 35.1 35.0 34.0 34.1 30.1 
E.  ECP'96 .........................................................................  .. .. .. .. .. ..  38.9  37.6 
Poland          
A.  Simple average of all estimates ...................................  33.8 35.1 34.5 41.6 34.8 31.3 26.9 22.1 
B.  Weighted average of various estimates .......................  31.0 32.8 32.3 38.1 34.5 32.0 27.9 25.9 
C.  Maddison data .............................................................  28.8 28.4 29.8 35.9 31.1 27.9 25.6 23.0 
D.  Extrapolation of conservative estimates ......................  26.3 27.8 27.4 32.3 30.1 26.3 24.0 22.0 
E.  ECP'96 .........................................................................  .. .. .. .. .. ..  26.1  21.9 
Romania          
A.  Simple average of all estimates ...................................  20.6 24.0 23.4 27.4 26.7 26.4 21.0 17.3 
B.  Weighted average of various estimates .......................  18.1 21.5 21.4 26.0 26.5 26.4 24.6 21.4 
C.  Maddison data .............................................................  16.5 18.0 19.2 23.3 22.4 20.3 17.5 15.5 
D.  Extrapolation of conservative estimates ......................  14.9 17.7 17.6 21.4 23.2 20.5 21.7 17.6 
E.  ECP'96 .........................................................................  .. .. .. .. .. ..  26.9  25.3 
SFR of Yugoslavia           
A.  Simple average of all estimates ...................................  22.9 25.7 24.6 29.6 31.8 30.7 29.8 23.8 
B.  Weighted average of various estimates .......................  20.3 23.4 24.7 29.8 32.4 30.7 31.6 25.1 
C.  Maddison data .............................................................  21.5 22.7 24.6 29.0 31.9 29.8 26.7 24.5 
D.  Extrapolation of conservative estimates ......................  19.1 22.0 23.3 28.1 32.4 27.0 29.2 23.6 
E.  ECP'96 .........................................................................  .. .. .. .. .. ..  31.0  27.9 
Soviet Union           
A.  Simple average of all estimates ...................................  37.5 39.7 40.7 43.0 41.1 38.6 33.3 30.5 
B.  Weighted average of various estimates .......................  33.9 37.2 38.2 41.1 41.5 38.4 33.8 33.9 
C.  Maddison data .............................................................  35.2 34.9 37.5 37.9 34.9 33.1 31.9 30.9 
D.  Extrapolation of conservative estimates ......................  30.5 33.4 34.3 36.9 39.5 32.3 30.0 30.5 
E.  ECP'96 .........................................................................  .. .. .. .. .. ..  33.8  32.5 
Source:  UNECE secretariat calculations, based on the data presented in table 1. 
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comparison, in the bottom panel of the tables we show the corresponding GDP growth rates for the 
United States, Germany (west) and the European Union member states prior to the 2004 enlargement 
(EU-15). 
According to these results, the picture of long-run growth performance during these three decades 
was broadly similar across the CPEs. The 1960s was still a decade of relatively strong economic 
growth in some parts of eastern Europe (especially in the less advanced economies) and the Soviet 
Union (following very robust growth performance during the 1950s). Economic growth throughout the 
region slowed down considerably but still remained positive during the 1970s. The 1980s was 
obviously a period of pronounced economic weakness: some of the CPEs merely stagnated for a 
decade; others (such as Poland and Romania) plunged into a recession. Notably the alternative 
estimates of economic growth in the CPEs are substantially different, and much lower (often, by 
several percentage points), than the corresponding official figures on economic growth for the same 
periods. 
We now look briefly at some of the main factors that shaped this trajectory of economic 
performance. One of the important sources of growth during the 1960s was the ongoing process of 
industrialization which was associated with the reallocation of resources from the less productive 
agricultural activity to more productive mining, manufacturing and utilities. This type of “extensive 
growth” involved both ample (probably excessive) accumulation of fixed capital in industrial activities 
and relocation of labour from rural/agricultural areas to urban/industrial sites. But being ideologically 
imposed and enforced through the system of central planning, the process of industrialization was 
clearly suboptimal and did not result in efficient resource allocation. With prices being 
administratively fixed and investment decisions directed by the central plan, the economic 
restructuring and industrialization reflected in the main the arbitrary decisions by the political elite, 
often void of economic rationale. Thus, it was only a matter of time before these inefficiencies 
translated into poor aggregate growth performance. 
During the 1970s, the process of extensive resource reallocation gradually came to an end and with 
it the growth momentum that it had generated. At the same time the built-in inefficiencies of the system 
of central planning started to affect economic performance and numerous macro- and microeconomic 
distortions translated into growing wastefulness of the economies.
14 Besides, the CPEs were largely 
insulated from the international markets through their non-convertible currencies and the managed trade 
within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). In the absence of competitive pressure 
and adequate economic incentives, the quality of potentially tradable goods was progressively falling 
behind international standards. Ironically, the CPEs were temporarily spared the need for a major 
adjustment caused by the two oil shocks of the 1970s, as they got most of their oil from the Soviet Union, 
with prices based on a moving average of world prices for the previous five years. This cushioned them 
from the severity of these shocks for several years. At the same time, it was a missed opportunity to 
restructure their economies and make them more efficient, especially with respect to the use of energy. 
In the 1980s, all of the problems that had been accumulating over time surfaced in full force. The 
CPEs were faced with huge amounts of sunk capital invested in highly inefficient industrial giants 
incapable of producing competitive goods that were sellable in the international markets. At the same 
time, the buffering effect of CMEA on oil trade was gradually phased out and eastern Europe had to 
pay much higher prices for oil imported from the USSR. With the perestroika in the USSR, all the 
remaining implicit subsidies to other CPEs in the trade with the Soviet Union were removed. Faced 
with mounting economic difficulties, the CPEs were forced to cut back fixed capital accumulation, 
which further reduced their growth potential. But the economic stagnation also meant that politicians 
could not deliver on their promises for continuously rising living standards. Some east European 
countries sought to compensate the dwindling domestic resources for consumption and investment by 
reverting to foreign borrowing. The outcome, especially after the skyrocketing of interest rates in the 
international financial markets after the mid-1980s was disastrous: four east European countries 
                                                   
14  The built-in inefficiencies of the system of central planning have been widely described and discussed in the literature so we 
do not go into more detail here. See, e.g. J. Kornai, Economics of Shortage (Amsterdam/New York, North-Holland, 1980). 10 
(Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania) were faced with severe debt crises and two of them 
(Bulgaria and Poland) ended up by defaulting on their foreign debt. 
The results shown in table 2 are evidence of the fact that there was virtually no catching up by the 
former CPEs with the developed market economies for the period between 1960 and 1990 as a whole. 
There was a relatively brief catch-up phase which continued roughly until the middle of the 1970s but 
afterwards the gap started to widen again. The dismal economic performance of the east European 
economies and the Soviet Union, which started in the 1970 and became especially evident during the 
1980, was one of the main pushes for the largely peaceful revolutions in the region and the start of 
economic and political transformation.  
TABLE 3 
Estimates of the implied long-run rates of growth of GDP in the former centrally planned economies, 1961-1990 
(Annual average rates of growth of real GDP measured in 1990 dollar prices and 1990 PPPs) 
  1961-1970  1971-1980  1981-1990  1961-1980  1971-1990  1961-1990 
Albania        
A. Simple average of all estimates ......................................................... ..  6.2  -3.9 .. .. .. 
B. Weighted average of various  estimates  ............................................. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
C. Maddison data .................................................................................... .. .. .. .. .. .. 
D. Extrapolation of conservative  estimates  ............................................. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Bulgaria        
A. Simple average of all estimates ......................................................... 6.2 2.4  -1.2 4.3 2.8 2.4 
B. Weighted average of various estimates ............................................. 6.3 3.6  -0.1 4.9 3.4 3.2 
C. Maddison data .................................................................................... 5.9  2.8  -0.2 4.3 2.9 2.8 
D. Extrapolation of conservative estimates ............................................. 6.3  3.8  -0.2 5.0 3.3 3.2 
Czechoslovakia        
A. Simple average of all estimates ......................................................... 2.8 2.6 0.3 2.7 2.2 1.9 
B. Weighted average of various estimates ............................................. 3.1 3.3 1.7 3.2 2.7 2.7 
C. Maddison data .................................................................................... 2.9  2.8 1.0 2.8 2.5 2.2 
D. Extrapolation of conservative estimates ............................................. 3.1  3.5 1.8 3.3 2.6 2.8 
German Democratic Republic        
A. Simple average of all estimates ......................................................... 3.2 2.8 0.1 3.0 2.5 2.0 
B. Weighted average of various estimates ............................................. 2.6 3.1 1.2 2.9 2.6 2.3 
C. Maddison data .................................................................................... 4.4  2.7  … 3.6 2.9  … 
D. Extrapolation of conservative estimates ............................................. 2.6  3.1 1.3 2.8 2.6 2.3 
Hungary        
A. Simple average of all estimates ......................................................... 3.9 2.6  -0.4 3.3 2.3 2.0 
B. Weighted average of various estimates ............................................. 4.3 3.2 0.7 3.8 2.9 2.7 
C. Maddison data .................................................................................... 3.6  2.7 0.1 3.1 2.2 2.1 
D. Extrapolation of conservative estimates ............................................. 4.3  3.4 0.7 3.9 2.8 2.8 
Poland        
A. Simple average of all estimates ......................................................... 4.1 3.2  -0.9 3.6 2.4 2.1 
B. Weighted average of various estimates ............................................. 4.3 3.8 0.1 4.0 2.9 2.7 
C. Maddison data .................................................................................... 4.2  3.6 0.1 3.9 2.9 2.6 
D. Extrapolation of conservative estimates ............................................. 4.3  4.1  -0.1 4.2 2.7 2.7 
Romania        
A. Simple average of all estimates ......................................................... 5.2 4.5  -1.0 4.9 3.6 2.9 
B. Weighted average of various estimates ............................................. 5.6 5.4 0.9 5.5 4.1 3.9 
C. Maddison data .................................................................................... 5.5  4.7  -0.7 5.1 3.7 3.1 
D. Extrapolation of conservative estimates ............................................. 5.6  6.0 0.7 5.8 3.8 4.1 
SFR of Yugoslavia        
A. Simple average of all estimates ......................................................... 4.7 5.8 0.7 5.2 4.0 3.7 
B. Weighted average of various estimates ............................................. 6.0 5.9 1.1 6.0 4.5 4.3 
C. Maddison data .................................................................................... 5.4  5.8 0.2 5.6 4.5 3.8 
D. Extrapolation of conservative estimates ............................................. 6.0  6.6 0.4 6.3 4.1 4.3 
Soviet Union        
A. Simple average of all estimates ......................................................... 5.0 3.2 0.1 4.1 2.9 2.8 
B. Weighted average of various estimates ............................................. 5.4 4.0 0.6 4.7 3.2 3.3 
C. Maddison data .................................................................................... 4.8  2.4 1.6 3.6 2.8 2.9 
D. Extrapolation of conservative estimates ............................................. 5.4  4.6 0.0 5.0 2.9 3.3 
Memorandum items:        
United States ......................................................................................... 4.2 3.3 2.8 3.7 3.3 3.4 
Germany (west) ..................................................................................... 4.4  2.7 2.2 3.6 2.6 3.1 
European Union (west Germany) .......................................................... 4.8 3.0 2.3 3.9 3.1 3.4 
Source:  UNECE secretariat calculations, based on the data presented in table 1. 
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III. Economic performance during the transition from plan to market (1990-2005) 
A.  Transformational recession and post-recession recovery 
One of the ultimate goals of the process of economic and political transformation that started in 
the former CPEs a decade and a half ago was – and still is – to improve the standards of living and the 
economic welfare of the population in these countries. The collapse of the political system in these 
countries mirrored the collapse of their economies, overburdened with inefficiencies, shortages, 
macroeconomic disequilibria and structural rigidities (accumulated over the decades), employing 
TABLE 4 
Estimates of the implied long-run rates of growth of GDP per capita in the former centrally planned economies, 1961-1990 
(Annual average rates of growth of real GDP per capita measured in 1990 dollar prices and 1990 PPPs) 
  1961-1970  1971-1980  1981-1990  1961-1980  1971-1990  1961-1990 
Albania        
A. Simple average of all estimates ................................................................  ..  3.9  -5.7 .. .. .. 
B. Weighted average of various estimates ...................................................  .. .. .. .. .. .. 
C. Maddison data ..........................................................................................  .. .. .. .. .. .. 
D. Extrapolation of conservative estimates ...................................................  .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Bulgaria        
A. Simple average of all estimates ................................................................  5.4 2.0  -1.1 3.7 2.4 2.1 
B. Weighted average of various estimates ...................................................  5.5 3.1 0.1 4.3 2.9 2.9 
C. Maddison data ..........................................................................................  5.1 2.4  -0.1 3.7 2.4 2.4 
D. Extrapolation of conservative estimates ...................................................  5.5 3.3  -0.1 4.4 2.8 2.9 
Czechoslovakia         
A. Simple average of all estimates ................................................................  2.3 1.9 0.0 2.1 1.8 1.4 
B. Weighted average of various estimates ...................................................  2.6 2.6 1.5 2.6 2.2 2.3 
C. Maddison data ..........................................................................................  2.4 2.1 0.8 2.3 2.1 1.8 
D. Extrapolation of conservative estimates ...................................................  2.6 2.8 1.6 2.7 2.1 2.3 
German Democratic Republic         
A. Simple average of all estimates ................................................................  3.3 3.0 0.2 3.1 2.6 2.1 
B. Weighted average of various estimates ...................................................  2.7 3.3 1.3 3.0 2.7 2.4 
C. Maddison data ..........................................................................................  4.5 2.9  .. 3.7 3.0  .. 
D. Extrapolation of conservative estimates ...................................................  2.7 3.3 1.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 
Hungary        
A. Simple average of all estimates ................................................................  3.5 2.3  -0.1 2.9 2.1 1.9 
B. Weighted average of various estimates ...................................................  4.0 2.9 1.0 3.4 2.7 2.6 
C. Maddison data ..........................................................................................  3.3 2.3 0.4 2.8 2.0 2.0 
D. Extrapolation of conservative estimates ...................................................  4.0 3.0 1.0 3.5 2.6 2.7 
Poland        
A. Simple average of all estimates ................................................................  3.1 2.3  -1.6 2.7 1.6 1.2 
B. Weighted average of various estimates ...................................................  3.3 2.8  -0.6 3.1 2.0 1.8 
C. Maddison data ..........................................................................................  3.2 2.6  -0.6 2.9 2.1 1.7 
D. Extrapolation of conservative estimates ...................................................  3.3 3.1  -0.8 3.2 1.9 1.9 
Romania        
A. Simple average of all estimates ................................................................  4.2 3.6  -1.4 3.9 2.6 2.1 
B. Weighted average of various estimates ...................................................  4.6 4.4 0.5 4.5 3.2 3.1 
C. Maddison data ..........................................................................................  4.5 3.7  -1.1 4.1 2.8 2.3 
D. Extrapolation of conservative estimates ...................................................  4.6 5.0 0.2 4.8 2.9 3.3 
SFR of Yugoslavia         
A. Simple average of all estimates ................................................................  3.6 4.8 0.2 4.2 3.1 2.9 
B. Weighted average of various estimates ...................................................  4.9 5.0 0.5 5.0 3.5 3.5 
C. Maddison data ..........................................................................................  4.3 4.9  -0.3 4.6 3.6 2.9 
D. Extrapolation of conservative estimates ...................................................  4.9 5.6  -0.2 5.3 3.2 3.4 
Soviet Union         
A. Simple average of all estimates ................................................................  3.7 2.3  -0.7 3.0 2.0 1.8 
B. Weighted average of various estimates ...................................................  4.1 3.0  -0.2 3.6 2.3 2.3 
C. Maddison data ..........................................................................................  3.5 1.5 0.8 2.5 1.9 1.9 
D. Extrapolation of conservative estimates ...................................................  4.1 3.6  -0.8 3.9 2.0 2.3 
Memorandum items:        
United States  ...............................................................................................  2.9 2.2 1.9 2.5 2.2 2.3 
Germany (west)  ...........................................................................................  3.5 2.6 2.0 3.0 2.4 2.7 
European Union (west Germany) ................................................................  4.0 2.5 2.1 3.3 2.6 2.9 
Source:  UNECE secretariat calculations, based on the data presented in table 1. 
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obsolete technologies and supplying final goods of mediocre quality, and largely isolated from the 
main international markets. The start of transition to a market economy generated high hopes and 
expectations on the part of the peoples living in the eastern part of the continent. However, the process 
of economic and political transformation turned out to be extremely difficult.  
The economic transformation in all former CPEs started with a sharp and prolonged output 
decline, a phenomenon that came to be known as the “transformational recession”.
15 Although it was 
expected that the radical systemic change would inevitably be accompanied by disruption in output 
performance, both the magnitude of the recession and its duration exceeded even the worst 
expectations. By now, there has been extensive research on the causes and nature of the 
transformational recession and these are well documented in the economic literature.
16 Some of the 
most important of these causes are:  
Supply-related causes:  
•  the institutional vacuum and disorganization after the breakdown of the previous institutional 
system: the system of central planning was abolished overnight but establishing a new market-
based system took considerable time;  
•  the huge amount of obsolete fixed capital in inefficient enterprises: its systematic 
underperformance under market conditions was equivalent to the erosion of the aggregate capital 
stock;  
•  the erosion of human capital: many workers found out that their skills were no longer in demand 
under the new conditions;  
•  the low quality of domestically produced goods: they were difficult to sell not only in 
international goods markets but also in the domestic markets after the international opening up of 
the economy; 
•  the rudimentary financial system: it could not perform proper financial intermediation (which 
could have partly cushioned the external and internal shocks).  
Demand-related causes:  
•  the breakdown of the previous administratively run “international market” (the CMEA) that used 
to absorb a significant share of the CPEs’ exports; 
•  the collapse in domestic consumer demand due to the erosion of purchasing power caused by the 
high inflation after the liberalization of prices and the sharp rise in unemployment;  
•  the sharp fall in investment activity as firms lost points of reference with respect to their future 
prospects. 
The actual growth performance of the east European and CIS economies in the period 1990-2005 
is reflected in table 5 and chart 1. 
The process of economic and political transformation started with a recession which was 
unprecedented by its depth. Thus, between 1989 and 1993 eastern Europe as a whole lost some 23 per 
cent of its aggregate GDP. In the CIS region the recession was even longer and deeper: between 1989 
and 1998 aggregate GDP in the CIS as a whole contracted by a cumulative 46 per cent. An economic 
contraction of this magnitude had never been seen before in peaceful times.  
                                                   
15 J. Kornai, “Transformational recession: a general phenomenon examined through the example of Hungary’s 
development”,  Economie Appliquée, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1993, pp. 181-227 and “Transformational recession: the main 
causes”, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 19, No. 1, August 1994, pp. 39-63. 
16  A comprehensive review of the related literature is available in N. Campos and F. Coricelli, “Growth in transition: what 
we know, what we don’t, and what we should”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 40, No. 3, September 2002, pp. 
793-836. See also C. Wyplosz, “Ten years of transformation: macroeconomic lessons”, CEPR Discussion Papers, No. 
2254 (London), 2000. 13 
While all east European and CIS 
economies fell victim to the transformational 
recession, its duration and depth differed 
across countries. The differences in 
performance largely reflect region- and 
country-specific factors. Geographic location 
and proximity to/distance from important 
markets as well as historic and cultural 
tradition were among such factors. For 
example, the central European countries 
benefited from their geographic proximity to 
the large western European markets and their 
traditional economic and cultural links with 
these countries. Accordingly, they were the 
first to overcome the transformational 
recession. In contrast, the recession lasted 
much longer in more distant (from the 
European “economic core”) south-east 
European countries. Moreover, the legacies of 
the command economy were relatively less 
entrenched in eastern Europe (where it lasted 
for some 40 years) compared to the Soviet 
Union (where communism ruled for more than 
seven decades). The transformational 
recession was therefore the most severe in 
those successor states of the Soviet Union that 
formed the CIS. 
A crucial factor in the success in the 
transition process was the sequencing and 
extent to which these countries successfully 
established the institutions that are necessary 
for the good functioning of a market economy. 
These institutions include the rule of law, 
property rights, corporate and non-corporate 
law, judicial system, competition regime, 
financial institutions and regulations, labour 
law and procedures for settling disputes, 
regulatory framework, etc. This factor also 
partly explains differences in performance 
between east European countries and the CIS. In the latter region the establishment of such institutions 
was much slower and patchier than in eastern Europe, which continuously hampered the establishment 
of CIS countries as well-functioning market economies.
17 
But the bold economic and political reforms undertaken by the east European and CIS countries 
have borne their fruit. The fundamental market reforms unleashed the previously suppressed 
entrepreneurial spirit, injecting new dynamism into these economies. The overhaul of the institutional 
framework in the direction of market-based business incentives contributed to far greater economic 
efficiency and productivity (see sections C and D below). Business sentiment soared, reflecting the 
                                                   
17  The importance of institutions and of the sequencing of their establishment in the transition process was forcefully and 
repeatedly argued by the UNECE in its Economic Survey of Europe. See, for instance, “Economic reform in the east: a 
framework for western support”, in UNECE, Economic Survey of Europe in 1989-1990 (United Nations publication, 
Sales No. E.90.II.E.1), pp. 5-26; and “The hard road to the market economy: problems and policies”, in UNECE, 
Economic Survey of Europe in 1990-1991 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.91.II.E.1), pp. 119-183.   
TABLE 5 
Real GDP in eastern Europe and the CIS, 1990-2005 












Eastern Europe .................... -2.0 3.0 4.1 1.6 3.5 
Albania .................................. -2.1 5.5 5.5 2.9 5.5 
Bosnia and Herzegovina ....... ..  23.2  4.2  ..  13.3 
Bulgaria ................................. -2.6  -0.8 4.9 0.4 2.0 
Croatia ................................... -6.2 3.4 4.3 0.4 3.9 
Czech Republic ..................... -1.0  1.5 3.3 1.3 2.4 
Estonia .................................. -6.2 5.6 7.1 2.0 6.3 
Hungary ................................. -2.4 4.0 3.8 1.8 3.9 
Latvia ..................................... -11.9 5.4 7.7 0.0 6.5 
Lithuania ................................ -10.0 4.2 7.5 0.3 5.8 
Poland ................................... 2.2 5.1 2.9 3.4 4.0 
Romania ................................ -2.1  -1.3 5.9 0.8 2.2 
Serbia and Montenegro ......... -13.7  0.2 4.9  -3.2 2.5 
Slovakia ................................. -2.9 3.7 4.8 1.8 4.2 
Slovenia ................................. -0.6 4.3 3.3 2.3 3.8 
The former Yugoslav 
  Republic of Macedonia ........ -4.7 3.0 1.2  -0.2 2.1 
CIS ......................................... -10.1 1.6 6.6  -0.9 4.1 
Armenia ................................. -12.0 5.1  11.7 1.1 8.4 
Azerbaijan ............................. -16.0 7.0  12.8 0.5 9.9 
Belarus .................................. -8.2  6.3 7.2 1.5 6.8 
Georgia .................................. -22.3  5.8 6.9  -4.2 6.4 
Kazakhstan ............................ -9.3 2.5  10.1 0.8 6.3 
Kyrgyzstan ............................. -12.7  5.6 4.0  -1.4 4.8 
Republic of Moldova .............. -17.0  -2.5 7.2  -4.6 2.2 
Russian Federation ............... -9.1 1.6 6.0  -0.7 3.8 
Tajikistan ............................... -18.6 0.0 9.2  -3.8 4.5 
Turkmenistan ......................... -8.8 4.5 3.5  -0.5 4.0 
Ukraine .................................. -13.7 -2.0  7.8 -3.0  2.8 
Uzbekistan ............................. -4.1 3.9 5.5 1.7 4.7 
Eastern Europe and CIS ..... -7.4 2.2 5.6 0.0 3.9 
New EU members (EU-8)  ..... -0.9  4.1  3.6  2.3  3.8 
Central Europe ................... 0.1  4.0 3.3 2.5 3.6 
Baltic states ........................ -9.9  4.8 7.5 0.5 6.1 
South-east Europe ................ -4.3 0.4 5.2 0.4 2.8 
CIS without Russian 
  Federation ........................... -12.0  1.7 7.9  -1.2 4.8 
European CIS ..................... -12.8  0.0 7.6  -2.1 3.7 
Caucasian CIS ................... -17.8 6.2  10.8  -1.1 8.5 
Central Asian CIS ............... -8.7 3.3 7.6 0.5 5.4 
Source:  UNECE secretariat calculations, based on national statistics. 14 
sharp upturn in expectations. Foreign direct investment poured into these dynamic emerging markets 
(especially in eastern Europe) adding further strength to their economies. The upturn in world 
commodity prices (particularly oil prices) in recent years contributed greatly to the overall 
strengthening of economic activity in the commodity exporting CIS countries. 
With the emergence from the transformational recession, the east European and CIS economies 
embarked on a path of strong economic growth. In the period 2000-2005, the average annual rate of 
GDP growth in the CIS was 6.6 per cent, in south-east Europe this rate was 5.2 per cent and in the 
eight new EU members it was 3.6 per cent (table 5). By 2001, aggregate GDP in eastern Europe 
recovered to its pre-transition level and in 2005 it was already 19 per cent higher than its level in 1989. 
In the CIS as a whole, aggregate GDP still has not recovered to its pre-transition level: in 2005 it was 
still at 85 per cent of the 1989 level. 
At present eastern Europe and the CIS are among the fastest growing regions of the world 
economy. At purchasing power parity rates the combined GDP of these economies is now greater than 
that of Japan and in recent years their aggregate output has been growing at an average annual rate 
close to 6 per cent. In fact, together with China, India and south-east Asia, these emerging market 
economies have become a new engine of growth for the global economy. 
While their recent growth performance is an impressive achievement, east European and CIS 
economies still face important economic challenges. One of the key policy objectives for all these 
countries is to reduce the still existing large gaps in per capita income levels vis-à-vis the developed 
market economies. Despite the rapid economic growth since the mid-1990s, the average GDP per 
capita (at PPPs) even in the most advanced economies, the new EU-members, was in 2004 still only 
36 per cent of that in the United States and 50 per cent of GDP per capita in the EU-15 (table 6). The 
average per capita GDP level in south-east Europe and the CIS is only one fifth of that in the United 
States and a quarter of that in the EU-15. Besides, the average figures mask considerable differences in 
per capita income levels within these subregions. For example, while GDP per capita in Russia is some 
25 per cent of that in the US, the Caucasian and Central Asian CIS economies on average make up for 
just one tenth of the US GDP per capita (some of the underlying factors of these developments are 
discussed in more detail in section C). 
CHART 1 
Real GDP in eastern Europe and the CIS, 1989-2005 
(Indices, 1989=100) 
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Source:  UNECE secretariat calculations, based on national statistics. 
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The process of economic transformation 
also had some negative social side effects that 
have not been fully overcome yet. The most 
acute among them has been the rapid increase 
in social inequality and the impoverishment of 
large segments of these societies. Both the 
incidence of poverty and income inequalities 
within countries rose sharply during the period 
of transformational recession. During the 
recovery these trends have been partly 
reversed in most of these countries but high 
poverty rates and sharp income differentiation 
remain widespread. These developments are 
not conducive to social cohesion. According to 
the latest World Bank estimates, the share of 
the population that lived below the 
internationally adopted (second) poverty line 
of $PPP 4.30/day in 2003 was 96 per cent in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 86 per cent in 
Uzbekistan, 85 per cent in Georgia and the 
Republic of Moldova, 93 per cent in Armenia, 
70 per cent in Azerbaijan, 66 per cent in 
Kazakhstan, 58 per cent in Romania, 41 per 
cent in Russia, and 33 per cent in Bulgaria.
18 
By the same estimates, the combined income 
share of the 20 per cent poorest families in 
Georgia and The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia was just 6 per cent of the 
economywide household income; in Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Russia and Uzbekistan it was 
7 per cent; in Lithuania, Poland, the Republic 
of Moldova and Tajikistan – 8 per cent; in 
Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine – 9 per cent. Reducing inequality and the incidence of 
poverty – without diluting incentives to work – will not only improve social cohesion but should also 
have a positive effect on future growth prospects. 
B.  Capital accumulation and employment dynamics during the transition 
Fixed investment 
Capital investment plays a key role in promoting economic development and growth, especially 
as a carrier of technological change. Economy-wide fixed capital accumulation is a complex process of 
channelling domestically generated and/or externally mobilized resources into productive use. The 
intensity and speed of capital accumulation are driven by a multitude of factors related to the economic 
fundamentals as well as the institutional, political and social environment of a country. The experience 
of the east European and CIS countries that undertook the transformation from planned to market 
economies, notably through the creation of competitive economic structures, provides ample evidence 
of the fundamental role of productive investment in the process of economic development. The 
countries that were more successful in economic transformation and growth were also those that 
managed to make greater progress in restructuring their productive capacity on the basis of new capital 
investment.  
                                                   
18 World  Bank,  Growth, Poverty and Inequality. Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Washington, D.C., 2005). 
TABLE 6 











Eastern Europe       
Albania  ................................... 10.3 .. .. 12.8 
Bosnia and Herzegovina ........ ..  ..  ..  18.7 
Bulgaria .................................. 17.9  18.6 19.5 19.8 
Croatia .................................... 22.6 24.7 29.2 29.4 
Czech Republic ...................... 45.7 40.2 45.8 46.3 
Estonia ................................... 23.9 25.3 31.1 33.2 
Hungary .................................. 33.5 34.1 39.7 39.3 
Latvia ...................................... 18.2 19.6 26.4 29.8 
Lithuania ................................. 20.7  22.5 28.7 31.8 
Poland .................................... 24.7  26.7 30.9 31.8 
Romania ................................. 23.7 16.1 19.4 20.6 
Serbia  and  Montenegro  .......... .. .. .. .. 
Slovakia .................................. 31.9  33.3 34.8 36.2 
Slovenia .................................. 47.5  46.9 51.0 52.2 
The former Yugoslav 
  Republic of Macedonia ......... 15.0  18.3 16.7 16.3 
CIS ..........................................     
Armenia .................................. 7.1 ..  6.2 10.8 
Azerbaijan .............................. 6.9 ..  7.9 9.6 
Belarus ................................... 18.6 ..  15.1 17.4 
Georgia ................................... 10.6 ..  7.3 7.4 
Kazakhstan ............................. 15.6 ..  14.4 17.6 
Kyrgyzstan .............................. 7.6 ..  4.7 4.6 
Republic of Moldova ............... 7.5  ..  4.8 4.9 
Russian Federation ................ 24.2 18.0 22.3 24.2 
Tajikistan ................................ 3.3 ..  2.6 2.9 
Turkmenistan .......................... 10.7  .. 13.4 17.4 
Ukraine ................................... 11.9  11.0 ..  15.7 
Uzbekistan .............................. 7.2 .. ..  4.7 
Source:  International comparison programs (ICP) and World Bank (WB) 
estimates (World Development Indicators database). 16 
Turning to the relationship between 
capital accumulation and economic growth, 
the conventional wisdom is centred on the 
view that capital accumulation drives growth. 
In the traditional, neoclassical, growth models, 
a rise in the investment rate does not affect the 
equilibrium rate of growth, but only the pace of 
transition from one steady state to another. The 
more recent “endogenous growth theory” 
subsumes a link between investment and the 
level of productive efficiency, and stresses the 
role of human capital. According to this strand 
of literature, the two main transmission 
channels through which fixed capital 
formation affects growth are: (i) the increased 
stock of physical capital in the economy 
(direct effect), and (ii) the technological 
upgrading associated with the investment 
(indirect effect).
19  However, capital 
accumulation is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for long-term growth; the latter 
depends on other factors, such as the levels of 
human capital and technological knowledge in 
the economy as well as the quality and other 
structural characteristics of the new 
investment, in particular its potential to 
enhance productive efficiency.
20 The 
experience of the centrally planned economies 
until the late 1980s is a blatant example of 
wasteful accumulation of unproductive and 
environmentally hazardous physical capital.  
The stylized facts presented below summarize some of the main trends in capital accumulation in 
eastern Europe and the CIS region since the start of their economic transformation. The patterns of 
capital accumulation in these economies have gone through different phases in that period. At the onset 
of transition, aggregate investment experienced a profound negative shock. The deep and prolonged 
transformational recession burdened most firms with excess capacity as huge sunk capital costs surfaced 
as a result of the knock-on effect of economic liberalization. The problems were further compounded by 
the inherited structure of the economy as all centrally planned economies were overindustrialized and the 
industrial structure was heavily concentrated in large state-owned firms. The inherited production 
facilities were generally obsolete and for firms to survive under market conditions, they had to undertake 
active restructuring and hence new productive investment. At the same time, the growth of the newly 
emerging private firms was conditional on their capacity to undertake large new investment. But in the 
early phases of transition equity and debt security markets were practically non-existent and virtually the 
only available source of external funding for most firms was domestic bank lending. The emerging 
financial markets (in the first place, the market for commercial credit) were inefficient and performed 
under considerable information asymmetries, as firms had no proper track record of creditworthiness. 
These market imperfections established additional barriers to the flow of financial resources to the 
enterprise sector, further limiting firms’ capacity to invest.  
                                                   
19  A. Hatemi and M. Irandoust, “Investigating causal relations between fixed investment and economic growth”, Economia 
Internazionale/International Economics, Vol. 55, No. 1, February 2002, pp. 25-35. 
20 K. Schmidt-Hebbel, L. Serven and A. Solimano, “Saving and investment: paradigms, puzzles, policies”, World Bank 
Research Observer, Vol. 11, No. 1, February 1996, pp. 87-117. 
TABLE 7 
Gross fixed capital formation in eastern Europe and the CIS, 1996-
2004 
(Average annual percentage change) 
  1996-2000  2001-2004  1996-2004 
Eastern Europe      
Albania .................................... ..  ..  .. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina ......... ..  ..  .. 
Bulgaria ................................... 3.3  14.3 8.0 
Croatia ..................................... 10.5  10.0 10.3 
Czech Republic ....................... 0.8 5.3 2.7 
Estonia .................................... 7.6 11.1  9.2 
Hungary ................................... 8.5 6.5 7.6 
Latvia ....................................... 19.6 13.1 16.7 
Lithuania .................................. 8.3  12.7 10.3 
Poland ..................................... 12.8  -2.5 5.7 
Romania .................................. 0.3 9.4 4.3 
Serbia and Montenegro ........... ..  ..  .. 
Slovakia ................................... 4.2 3.4 3.9 
Slovenia ................................... 11.1 5.0 8.3 
The former Yugoslav 
  Republic of Macedonia .......... -1.1 2.1 0.3 
CIS      
Armenia ................................... 8.1  19.0 12.8 
Azerbaijan ............................... 34.3 37.6 35.7 
Belarus .................................... 5.0  10.9 7.6 
Georgia .................................... ..  ..  .. 
Kazakhstan .............................. -3.2 14.0  4.1 
Kyrgyzstan ............................... -0.4  -4.7 -2.3 
Republic of Moldova ................ -1.8 12.2  4.2 
Russian Federation ................. -4.4 9.3 1.5 
Tajikistan ................................. ..  ..  .. 
Turkmenistan ........................... ..  ..  .. 
Ukraine .................................... -1.8  6.2 1.6 
Uzbekistan ............................... ..  ..  .. 
Source:  UNECE secretariat calculations, based on national statistics. 17 
The trends in investment activity in the 
east European and CIS economies during the 
transition can be traced in the dynamics of their 
real gross fixed capital formation (table 7) and 
the corresponding investment ratios (reported 
in table 8).
21 These statistics in the main reflect 
the typical pro-cyclical pattern of fixed 
investment, which was especially pronounced 
in eastern Europe. As noted, the 
transformational recession in the initial phase 
of transition had a very large (more than 
proportionate) negative effect on investment 
activity, which is reflected in declining 
investment ratios. Conversely, the recovery 
was accompanied by a robust upturn in 
investment activity. 
One of the differences between the 
patterns of economic performance in the two 
subregions during the transition is related to 
the phasing of the recovery of fixed 
investment. In eastern Europe as a whole, the 
transformational recession lasted for about five 
years; after 1994 economic growth in the 
region resumed and has continued to date 
(chart 1). In this subregion, the recovery of 
investment generally led the recovery of 
aggregate output: aggregate investment in 
some countries (notably in central Europe) 
started to pick up already in 1991-1992, to 
some extent pushed by the influx of FDI to the 
countries most advanced in the reforms. In the 
CIS, the period of transformational recession 
and weak investment activity was more 
protracted and continued throughout the 
1990s, further aggravated by the Russian 
financial crisis in 1998. The recovery of 
investment activity in the CIS only followed 
the pickup of aggregate output with a lag, and 
it was only after the start of recovery in 1999 
that investment started to pick up.
22 Partly 
reflecting the earlier start of recovery, but also the different sectoral composition of investment (as 
discussed below), the east European economies have been channelling since 1997, on average, 2 to 4 
percentage points more of their GDP into fixed investment than the countries of the CIS.
23 
The importance of capital accumulation for economic growth in eastern Europe and the CIS is 
demonstrated in chart 2. The scatter diagram illustrates the correlation between fixed investment and 
                                                   
21  The data on real gross fixed capital formation for the first half of the 1990s are rather patchy, so we have not presented 
them in table 7. 
22  The different patterns of FDI flows have contributed significantly to this differentiated dynamics of capital accumulation 
in the two regions. Thus at the end of 2003 the cumulative (since 1990) stock of FDI in eastern Europe amounted to more 
than 37 per cent of its aggregate GDP, while for the CIS as a whole this figure was just 16 per cent. 
23 The upturn of the average CIS investment ratio in 2003 was due exclusively to the very high investment rate in 
Azerbaijan that year. 
TABLE 8 
Share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP in eastern Europe 
and the CIS, 1990-2004 












Eastern Europe .................... 19.4  22.5 22.0 21.3 19.6 
Albania  .................................. .. .. .. .. .. 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  ....... .. .. .. .. .. 
Bulgaria ................................. 16.5  13.6 18.5 16.2 16.0 
Croatia ................................... 13.6 21.4 24.8 19.9 23.1 
Czech Republic ..................... 26.9  29.6 27.2 27.9 28.4 
Estonia .................................. 23.7 26.9 27.7 26.5 27.3 
Hungary ................................. 20.0 22.2 23.0 21.9 22.6 
Latvia ..................................... 13.8 19.2 24.8 19.3 22.0 
Lithuania ................................ 23.8 22.4 20.4 22.2 21.4 
Poland ................................... 16.8  21.3 20.0 19.3 20.6 
Romania ................................ 18.3 20.3 21.1 19.9 20.7 
Serbia and Montenegro ......... 12.7  12.0 14.9 12.5 12.5 
Slovakia ................................. 28.3 31.4 26.5 28.7 29.0 
Slovenia ................................. 19.4 23.0 24.3 22.2 23.7 
The former Yugoslav 
  Republic of Macedonia ........ 18.2 17.1 16.1 17.2 16.6 
CIS ......................................... 23.6  19.0 18.7 20.4 18.9 
Armenia ................................. 24.4 16.6 20.6 20.5 18.6 
Azerbaijan ............................. 20.1 29.2 37.4 28.9 33.3 
Belarus .................................. 27.3  24.7 24.4 25.5 24.5 
Georgia .................................. 14.4 21.6 26.4 20.8 24.0 
Kazakhstan ............................ 29.5 17.7 22.2 23.1 19.9 
Kyrgyzstan ............................. 15.5  16.8 15.4 15.9 16.1 
Republic of Moldova .............. 18.2 19.2 17.8 18.4 18.5 
Russian Federation ............... 23.4 17.9 17.8 19.7 17.8 
Tajikistan ............................... 11.6 16.5  9.1 12.6 13.2 
Turkmenistan  ......................... .. .. .. .. .. 
Ukraine .................................. 23.6 20.5 15.8 20.0 18.2 
Uzbekistan ............................. 26.7 30.0 24.9 27.8 28.5 
Eastern Europe and CIS ..... 22.4 20.4 19.9 20.7 19.1 
New EU members (EU-8)  ..... 20.9  24.1  22.8  22.6  23.4 
Central Europe ................... 20.9  24.2 22.8 22.6 23.5 
Baltic states ........................ 20.7  22.5 23.4 22.2 22.9 
South-east Europe ................ 16.4 18.0 20.1 18.0 18.9 
CIS without Russian 
  Federation ........................... 24.1 21.9 20.8 22.2 21.4 
European CIS ..................... 24.1  21.5 18.2 21.2 19.9 
Caucasian CIS ................... 18.2  23.6 30.0 24.1 26.8 
Central Asian CIS ............... 26.3 21.9 22.0 23.5 22.3 
Source:  UNECE secretariat calculations, based on national statistics. 
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economic growth for these economies for the 
period 1995-2003. The relationship is positive 
– albeit rather weak – in line with the results 
of similar studies for other groups of 
countries.
24  
Chart 3 illustrates the sources of 
financing of gross domestic capital formation 
and highlights some important cross-country 
differences. On average the east European 
economies relied more than the CIS on 
national savings as a source of financing their 
domestic investment. Thus for the period 
1990-2003 as a whole, on average 81 per cent 
of gross capital formation in the east European 
economies was backed by national savings, 
whereas the corresponding share for the CIS 
economies was 65 per cent.
25 At the same time, 
part of the gross capital formation was financed 
by mobilizing foreign savings in the form of 
capital inflows. This reliance on foreign savings 
increased during the 1997-2003 period 
compared to 1990-1996. This was, however, 
not the case in the CIS, where a number of 
countries financed their gross capital 
formation entirely by national savings.  
Within the CIS, there was no uniform 
pattern with regard to the degree of reliance on national savings; indeed, it is possible to identify two 
extremes in the relationship between savings and investment in this region. On the one hand, some 
countries saved more than they invested domestically, and hence exported capital (in 1997-2003 these 
were Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Ukraine). On the other hand, in countries 
such as Armenia and the Republic of Moldova, national savings in the same period were on average 
negative, which implies that gross capital formation was entirely financed by foreign capital inflows. 
Notably, during the second subperiod (1997-2003), the divergence in saving and investment patterns 
among the CIS economies increased compared to 1990-1996. This divergence largely reflects 
differences in the structural features of these economies. Those that exported capital are among the 
resource-rich economies, and their current account surpluses reflect large and increasing revenues 
from the export of natural resources. In contrast, the countries that relied exclusively on attracting 
capital from abroad are among the less developed and are poor in natural resources. Nevertheless, even 
the resource-rich CIS economies could, in principle, benefit from a higher degree of absorption of the 
national savings that they generate, if these were to be channelled into productive investment. Notably, 
policies targeting the establishment of an environment conducive to entrepreneurship could play a 
beneficial role in raising the level of domestic investment in these countries.   
Table 9 and chart 4 present a rough picture of the changes in the sectoral composition of gross 
fixed capital formation in eastern Europe and the CIS during the period 1992-2002. These data 
illustrate the important structural changes that took place during the transition process. Again, the 
pattern of change in eastern Europe was somewhat different from that in the CIS. Throughout eastern 
Europe, over the 10-year period, there was a general shift in the direction of fixed investment from 
manufacturing towards services. While there were important specificities across countries (for example, 
                                                   
24  The coefficient of correlation for the whole group of countries presented in the chart is only 0.13. The observed relatively 
high cross-country dispersion most probably reflects the still high output volatility in these immature markets. 
25  Unweighted averages for the corresponding groups of countries. 
CHART 2 
Fixed investment and economic growth in selected east European 
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Source:  UNECE secretariat calculations, based on national statistics. 19 
related to the share of investment going to different types of service activities or to the agricultural 
sector), this general pattern of change in the composition of fixed investment could be observed in all 
east European economies. This shift mirrored the faster expansion of the tertiary sector activities 
during the transition period.  
As for the CIS, the most striking feature of the compositional changes in fixed investment 
between 1992 and 2002 was the considerable increase in the share of industrial investment, on average 
by more than 10 percentage points (chart 4). This mainly reflects the dramatic fall in investment in 
agriculture, and only a slight increase, on average, in the share of investment in services. However, there 
were significant changes in the shares of investment going to different service activities, the largest 
increase being in transport and communications. The growing share of industrial investment 
mainly reflects the increasing and excessive reliance of these economies on the extraction of 
natural resources; it is these activities in the resource-rich CIS economies that have attracted 
the most investment (both domestic and foreign) since 1995. Compared to the east European 
economies, less investment has gone to business services and to higher value added 
manufacturing activities. Their strong reliance on natural resources, however, makes these 
countries vulnerable to downturns in world commodity markets. 
CHART 3 
Gross capital formation and its sources of financing in selected east European and CIS economies 
(Per cent of GDP) 
 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source:  UNECE secretariat calculations, based on national statistics. 
Note:  The countries in each subregion are shown in the descending order of their gross investment ratios. 20 
TABLE 9 
Gross fixed capital formation by major sectors of economic activity in eastern Europe and the CIS, 
1992, 1997 and 2002 
(Per cent of total gross fixed capital formation) 
  1992  1997  2002      1992  1997  2002 
Bulgaria         Slovakia     
Agriculture ....................................  4.9 2.9 2.5    Agriculture ...................................  4.5 3.3 3.5 
Industry ........................................  51.2 35.5 33.9   Industry  .......................................  47.7 36.1 39.0 
Construction .................................  3.4 7.0 6.0    Construction ................................  3.3 2.7 0.8 
Wholesale and retail trade ...........  11.4 10.6 20.1    Wholesale and retail trade ..........  4.6 8.6 6.3 
Transport, communications .........  8.4 21.6 22.5    Transport,  communications  .........  9.1 11.7 14.3 
Other services ..............................  20.8 22.5 15.0    Other services .............................  30.8 37.5 36.0 
Croatia         Slovenia     
Agriculture ....................................  6.7 3.0 3.3    Agriculture ...................................  2.3 1.2 1.0 
Industry ........................................  30.6 32.0 26.6   Industry  .......................................  36.8 37.1 35.8 
Construction .................................  1.7 4.0 8.9    Construction ................................  1.8 3.2 3.1 
Wholesale and retail trade ...........  8.1 9.9  16.8    Wholesale and retail trade ..........  12.6 13.9 14.1 
Transport, communications .........  27.7 13.2 11.6    Transport,  communications  .........  15.5 12.7 12.2 
Other services ..............................  25.2 37.8 32.6    Other services ...........................  31.1 31.9 33.8 
Czech Republic        Belarus     
Agriculture ....................................  4.0 3.7 2.7    Agriculture ...................................  19.7 6.8 5.4 
Industry ........................................  42.9 34.7 32.3   Industry  .......................................  25.0 32.3 32.3 
Construction .................................  2.4 3.3 3.4    Construction ................................  2.9 1.5 2.1 
Wholesale and retail trade ...........  3.9 8.7 9.1    Wholesale and retail trade ..........  1.7 3.2 4.2 
Transport, communications .........  11.0 17.3 18.2    Transport,  communications  .........  9.8 16.8 18.0 
Other services ..............................  35.8 32.2 34.2    Other services .............................  40.7 39.4 38.0 
Hungary        Georgia     
Agriculture ....................................  3.4 3.6 3.0    Agriculture ...................................  17.1 –  0.3 
Industry ........................................  30.9 31.6 29.4   Industry  .......................................  31.5 30.5 21.0 
Construction .................................  1.8 1.9 2.2    Construction ................................  3.0 2.6  22.9 
Wholesale and retail trade ...........  7.0 7.9 8.2    Wholesale and retail trade ..........  2.6 2.3 5.1 
Transport, communications .........  17.6 17.2 15.3    Transport,  communications  .........  12.4 42.9 38.6 
Other services ..............................  39.4 37.8 41.9    Other services .............................  33.4 21.8 12.1 
Lithuania        Kazakhstan      
Agriculture ....................................  6.8 2.8 2.1    Agriculture ...................................  27.7 1.9 1.5 
Industry ........................................  33.6 28.7 28.6   Industry  .......................................  31.9 58.6 53.5 
Construction .................................  0.8 1.9 2.7    Construction ................................  2.7 2.7 4.6 
Wholesale and retail trade ...........  4.9 8.7  16.9    Wholesale and retail trade ..........  1.3 2.0 4.5 
Transport, communications .........  17.4 30.9 20.1    Transport,  communications  .........  4.5 11.6 11.1 
Other services ..............................  36.5 27.0 29.5    Other services .............................  31.9 23.2 24.9 
Poland        Russian Federation     
Agriculture ....................................  3.7 2.9 2.0    Agriculture ...................................  12.3 2.9 3.0 
Industry ........................................  39.0 39.4 30.6   Industry  .......................................  37.6 34.8 42.6 
Construction .................................  4.3 6.3 7.2    Construction ................................  3.2 4.1 2.9 
Wholesale and retail trade ...........  6.5 9.3  11.5    Wholesale and retail trade ..........  1.4 2.3 2.2 
Transport, communications .........  8.8 12.1 11.5    Transport,  communications  .........  9.8 17.0 24.6 
Other services ............................  37.8 30.1 37.2    Other services .............................  35.7 38.9 24.8 
Romania        Ukraine      
Agriculture ....................................  9.3 8.3 9.0    Agriculture ...................................  20.5 7.0 5.3 
Industry ........................................  53.7 44.9 39.3   Industry  .......................................  31.3 40.4 40.6 
Construction .................................  2.5 7.2 6.5    Construction ................................  3.2 1.6 4.9 
Wholesale and retail trade ...........  6.9 10.2 12.2    Wholesale and retail trade ..........  2.1 1.5 6.6 
Transport, communications .........  12.0 11.7 18.9    Transport,  communications  .........  6.9 15.4 18.8 
Other services ............................  15.7 17.7 14.1    Other services .............................  36.1 34.1 23.7 
Source:  UNECE secretariat, based on national statistics. 
Note:  Whenever available, three-year moving averages are shown for each year. 
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Labour inputs 
We now turn to a brief overview of dynamics of employment in eastern Europe and the CIS 
during the transition from plan to market.
26 Section C below discusses in more detail some of the 
implications of the labour market adjustment for productivity and economic growth in eastern Europe 
in this period.  
The transformational recession had a profoundly negative impact on employment in eastern 
Europe and the CIS. Between 1989 and 1993 total employment in eastern Europe contracted by 15 per 
                                                   
26 For a comprehensive analysis of the main labour market trends during the transition, see S. Cazes and A. Nesporova, 
Labour Markets in Transition: Balancing Flexibility and Security in Central and Eastern Europe (Geneva, International 
Labour Office, 2003). The overview presented in this section partly draws from some of the conclusions of these authors. 
CHART 4 
Breakdown of gross fixed capital formation by major sectors of economic activity in eastern Europe and the CIS,1992 and 2002 
(Per cent of total) 
 
































































Source:  UNECE secretariat calculations, based on national statistics. 
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cent while the CIS as a whole lost some 17 per 
cent of its employed labour between 1989 and 
1998 (see table 10 for details). Part of this 
decline, particularly at the onset of transition, 
reflects the need to reduce or eliminate 
overemployment, which was endemic in the 
centrally planned economies. Overemployment 
was a policy aimed at preventing open 
unemployment, which was achieved mostly 
through artificially low, centrally set wages. As 
a consequence, the traditional state-owned 
firms, especially the industrial giants, embarked 
on the process of transition burdened with large 
amounts of excess labour. Market liberalization 
(liberalization of prices and of the access to 
domestic and international markets) suddenly 
exposed domestic firms to strong competitive 
pressures and rationalizing of their workforce 
was therefore an essential ingredient of their 
adjustment. What remains, however 
questionable, was the speed of the process of 
market liberalization, especially in countries 
that opted for “shock therapy” reforms. Local 
firms were in fact not given sufficient time to 
adjust to the shocks of transition, with profound 
negative effect on the firms’ survival rate. In 
the event, many potentially viable firms were 
forced into bankruptcy or into below-optimal 
downsizing. As a result, both the depth of the 
ensuing recession and the contraction in 
employment turned out to be excessively high. 
Labour demand collapsed since 1990 and 
total employment shrank strongly throughout 
the transition process. Workers who lost their 
job took two different routes: withdrawal from 
the labour force or unemployment. The first 
alternative (i.e. flows into inactivity) generally 
involved more workers than the second one 
(unemployment). Massive withdrawal from the 
labour force resulted in a sharp decline in labour force participation rates (the proportion of population at 
working age of 15-64 that is economically active) in all countries of eastern Europe and the CIS. Labour 
force participation fell particularly among the young (aged up to 24 years), (initially) among the elderly (the 
50-64 age group) and among less competitive and more disadvantaged groups of workers. Separation from 
the labour force was due to forced retirement of working pensioners, early retirement schemes, voluntary 
withdrawals, workers’ becoming discouraged and extended parental leave. Labour force participation also 
declined among the young because they extended their studies, thereby postponing their entry into the 
labour force, due to the bleak prospects of finding a job. For them the passage from studies to employment 
became more difficult because of mismatches between young people’s skills and the changing structure of 
labour demand, partly due to the belated adaptation of educational systems to changing skill requirements 
that emerged in the labour market. The second alternative for exit from employment, i.e. unemployment, 
hit harder those groups of workers that combined different types of disadvantages, e.g. lower skills, higher 
age, geographical immobility, health problems or employer prejudice. It resulted in high and persistent 
unemployment in all countries of the region. 
TABLE 10 
Total employment in eastern Europe and the CIS, 1990-2004 












Eastern Europe .................... -3.1  -0.5 -0.4 -1.4 -0.4 
Albania .................................. -4.1 -1.6 -3.4 -3.0 -2.4 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  ....... .. ..  -1.4 .. .. 
Bulgaria ................................. -4.3  -1.9  2.1 -1.7 -0.2 
Croatia ................................... -5.3 -0.9  1.3 -1.9  0.0 
Czech Republic ..................... -1.6  -0.9 -0.1 -0.9 -0.6 
Estonia .................................. -5.2 -2.0  1.0 -2.3 -0.7 
Hungary ................................. -6.1 0.9 0.3  -1.8 0.7 
Latvia ..................................... -5.8 -0.7  2.0 -1.8  0.5 
Lithuania ................................ -2.4 -1.1  0.7 -1.1 -0.3 
Poland ................................... -2.0  0.4 -0.6 -0.7  0.0 
Romania ................................ -3.2 -1.7 -1.7 -2.3 -1.7 
Serbia and Montenegro ......... -2.6  -1.2 -0.5 -1.5 -0.9 
Slovakia ................................. -3.4 -0.4  0.8 -1.1  0.1 
Slovenia ................................. -3.8 0.5 0.5  -1.1 0.5 
The former Yugoslav 
  Republic of Macedonia ........ -6.8 -2.7 -4.5 -4.7 -3.5 
CIS ......................................... -2.5  -0.6 1.1  -0.8 0.2 
Armenia ................................. -2.9 -4.1 -0.5 -2.6 -2.5 
Azerbaijan ............................. -0.5 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.6 
Belarus .................................. -3.1  0.1 -0.6 -1.2 -0.2 
Georgia .................................. -8.9  0.5 -0.8 -3.3 -0.1 
Kazakhstan ............................ -3.4 -1.1  3.7 -0.6  1.0 
Kyrgyzstan ............................. -1.2  1.5 1.8 0.6 1.6 
Republic of Moldova .............. -4.2 -2.0 -3.5 -3.2 -2.6 
Russian Federation ............... -3.2 –  1.2  -0.8  0.5 
Tajikistan ............................... -0.9 -1.2  1.9 -0.2  0.2 
Turkmenistan ......................... 3.4 1.8 1.9 2.4 1.8 
Ukraine .................................. -1.4 -3.2  0.1 -1.6 -1.7 
Uzbekistan ............................. 1.2 1.2 2.5 1.6 1.8 
Eastern Europe and CIS ..... -2.7 -0.5  0.7 -1.0  0.0 
New EU members (EU-8)  ..... -2.9  0.0  -0.1  -1.1  0.0 
Central Europe ................... -2.7  0.2 -0.2 -1.0  0.0 
Baltic states ........................ -4.1  -1.2  1.2 -1.6 -0.1 
South-east Europe ................ -3.5 -1.3 -0.8 -2.0 -1.1 
CIS without Russian 
  Federation ........................... -1.6  -1.2  1.0 -0.7 -0.3 
European CIS ..................... -1.8  -2.6 -0.2 -1.6 -1.5 
Caucasian CIS ................... -3.6  -0.4  0.1 -1.4 -0.2 
Central Asian CIS ............... -0.6 0.4 2.7 0.7 1.4 
Source:  UNECE secretariat calculations, based on national statistics. 23 
It was widely hoped that the economic recovery would be accompanied by an upturn in the labour 
markets. But this has materialized only to a very limited degree so far. Thus between 1994 (the start of the 
recovery) and 2004, aggregate GDP in eastern Europe grew by almost 50 per cent while total employment 
continued to decline by a cumulative 5.6 per cent. In the CIS the recession and the accompanying 
downward adjustment in labour lasted longer, until 1998. Thereafter, between 1999 and 2004 aggregate 
GDP recovered by a cumulative 49 per cent and total employment grew by a cumulative 8 per cent. 
However, as noted, aggregate GDP in the CIS as a whole still has not recovered to its pre-transition level. 
Several factors seem to have weakened the association between aggregate output growth and labour 
market outcomes in the countries that undertook the transition from plan to market. First of all, labour 
hoarding may still be widespread in some countries, implying that employment responses to output 
growth are weak or absent. Second, economic expansion in many countries has taken place in sectors 
that are not labour intensive, particularly in commodity exporting CIS economies. Third, labour mobility 
across sectors of production and regions is still relatively low in most of these economies, implying a low 
degree of labour redeployment from declining to expanding sectors or regions. This, in turn, tends to 
push up unemployment, especially to the extent that the economic restructuring and transformation 
involves “creative destruction” and the clustering of job opportunities in some sectors or regions. Last 
but not least, a more in-depth look at the relevant data
27 seems to suggest that labour markets have been 
relatively more responsive to economic growth in countries that have made more progress in enterprise 
and labour market reforms. Thus, active restructuring of inefficient firms (in particular, firms inherited 
from the era of central planning) reduces the incidence of labour hoarding, which, in turn, facilitates the 
transmission of labour demand associated with output growth into net job creation.  
C.  Changes in real GDP per capita in eastern Europe: the role of productivity, labour 
market performance and demographic structure  
This section focuses on the dynamics of labour productivity since the beginning of transition and 
the repercussions on labour utilization. It explores at the same time the linkages between labour 
productivity, labour utilization, and the demographic structure of the population on the one side and 
the evolution of real per capita incomes on the other side. While productivity growth is an indicator of 
economic performance, real per capita income is the best available summary gauge for international 
comparisons of living standards. We focus on 10 countries of eastern Europe,
28 leaving out – mainly 
due to data problems – other countries in the region, especially the CIS and other south-east European 
countries. The analysis covers the period 1990-2005.
29  
Our analysis seeks to illustrate the key role of labour productivity for understanding the evolution 
of real incomes over time and for the process of real convergence of lower income countries (in this 
case eastern Europe) to economically more advanced economies. At the same time it sheds some light 
on the important role of labour market and demographic factors for more fully translating gains in 
productivity into increases in real per capita incomes. 
The analytical framework 
The basic analytical framework is provided by the following identity:  
GDP/POP = GDP/EMP  x  EMP/POP,   (1) 
where GDP denotes aggregate real output/income, POP is total population and EMP is the total 
number of persons employed. Labour input is measured here by the number of persons employed, 
given the lack of (reliable) series for total annual hours worked for all countries.   
                                                   
27  For more details see box IV.2 in World Economic Situation and Prospects 2006 (United Nations, New York, 2006), p. 102. 
28  Eastern Europe-10 (EE-10) refers to 10 east European economies that have been divided into the following subgroupings: 
Central Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia: CE-5), Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) 
and South-east Europe (Bulgaria, Romania: SEE-2).  
29  The data for 2005 are preliminary estimates. 24 
Equation (1) indicates that the level of real income per capita is determined by the average labour 
productivity (GDP/EMP) and the proportion of the population that is actually working (EMP/POP). 
Ceteris paribus, an increase in the number of persons employed relative to the population will 
unambiguously raise total output and therefore income per capita. In case the productivity of the 
additional workers is lower than the average productivity of the existing workforce, there might, 
however, be a fall in the average productivity of the enlarged workforce, although this would in 
general be small.
30 This could be the case if the additional workers are less well educated, have below 
average or unsuitable skills or are less experienced. This points to a potential trade-off, at least in the 
short term, between raising aggregate productivity and the overall employment rate in the economy. 
The level of employment can be raised from two sources, namely (i) the pool of currently 
unemployed persons in the total labour force (LF), and (ii) by increasing the overall labour force 
participation among the population at working age (i.e. from 15 to 64 years old) (POP15-64). The latter 
would target e.g. those groups of persons that are in principle interested in taking on work, but are 
discouraged by the existing obstacles. A case in point are women who stay at home to look after their 
children, in the absence of adequate childcare facilities.  
Equation (2) takes these factors explicitly into account by a simple extension of the EMP/POP 
ratio:  
GDP/POP = GDP/EMP x  EMP/LF X LF/POP15-64 X POP15-64/POP   (2) 
EMP/LF is the mirror image of the unemployment rate, which is defined as 1-(EMP/LF). The 
product of the second and third terms on the RHS of (2) is equal to the so-called employment rate, i.e. the 
proportion of persons employed as a percentage of the population at working age – EMP/POP15-64.
31 
The fourth variable – POP15-64/POP – on the RHS of (2) is a kind of an inverse dependency ratio.
32 It 
points to the importance of the age structure of the population for real incomes per capita. An ageing 
population that increases the share of the population above 64 will ceteris paribus exert downward 
pressure on real incomes as will, at least temporarily, a “baby boom”.  
Equation (2) can be analysed for a given country over time. It can also be employed for an 
international comparison of countries in a given year
33 or during a longer time period, as is the case here.  
Developments in eastern Europe-10 
As noted above, real GDP in eastern Europe fell abruptly during the first years of the reform 
process. But the transformational recession was followed by a long period of sustained and 
increasingly robust economic growth since the mid-1990s. This is also mirrored in the development of 
real incomes per capita, which fell between 1990 and 1995, but rose considerably thereafter. For the 
aggregate of the EE-10, real GDP per capita rose by some 45 per cent in 2005 compared with 1995. As 
compared to 1990, it had accumulated a gain of 38 per cent (table 11). The main factor behind the rise 
in real incomes has been the surge in labour productivity, which increased by some 70 per cent in 2005 
compared with 1990, i.e. nearly twice as much as the increase in real incomes per capita.  
The reason why the surge in productivity did not translate into a broadly similar large rise in real 
incomes is the adverse developments in the labour markets. There has not only been a sharp rise in 
                                                   
30 It is assumed that the additional workers do not have a negative impact on the productivity of the already employed 
persons. 
31  Raising the employment rate is one of the targets of the so-called Lisbon Agenda that member states of the European 
Union agreed upon in 2000. Another major objective is to raise productivity levels, which, as already noted, may be in 
conflict with the goal to raise employment rates, at least in the short run.  
32 The dependency ratio is equal to the number of individuals aged below 15 or above 64 divided by the number of 
individuals aged between 15 and 64, expressed as a percentage. It can be shown that the inverse of the ratio POP15-64/POP 
is equal to 1 plus the dependency ratio.  
33  For an analysis of OECD countries see B. van Ark and R. Guckin, “International comparisons of labor productivity and 
per capita income”, BLS Monthly Labor Review, July 1999, pp. 33-41. 25 
unemployment (as reflected in a falling employment-labour force ratio) but also the labour force 
participation rate has fallen significantly. Thus, in the EE-10, the level of unemployment has remained high 
despite the robust economic growth since the mid-1990s. The labour force participation rate, moreover, fell 
to only 65 per cent in 2005, down from (a very high) 77 per cent in 1990 and 70 per cent in 1995 (table 11). 
The steady rise of the proportion of the population at working age in total population provided only some 
small offset to these negative effects on GDP per capita originating in the labour markets.  
Enterprises initially reacted to systemic change by undertaking so-called “passive industrial 
restructuring”, reflected in massive labour shedding, which to a large extent was aimed at the 
elimination of over-manning inherited from the socialist period. This resulted in the immediate (albeit 
only partial) reversal of low productivity levels of that period, despite falling output levels. 
Towards the mid-1990s eastern Europe recovered from the initial slump in output and entered the 
phase of “active industrial restructuring”, based on large-scale privatization, massive entry of FDI, 
upgrading of product quality, strong increase in exports and rapid gains in labour productivity thanks 
to the modernization of the capital stock but also additional rationalization measures, which led to 
further labour shedding. Throughout the 1990s total employment in the EE-10 was either declining or 
TABLE 11 
Per capita GDP in eastern Europe: the role of productivity, labour market performance and the demographic structure, 1990-2005 
(main country groupings) 
  GDP/Pop  GDP/Emp  Emp/LF  LF/Pop 15-64  Pop 15-64/Pop 
Memorandum item:  
Emp/Pop 15-64 
  Indices, 1990=100  Ratios (per cent) 
Central  Europe        
1990 ........................................ 100  100 96 73 65 71 
1995 ........................................ 100  116 89 67 67 59 
2000 ........................................ 122  143 86 66 69 57 
2005 ........................................ 145  172 86 64 71 55 
Baltic  states        
1990 ........................................ 100  100 97 73 67 72 
1995 ........................................ 63 73 87 71 66 62 
2000 ........................................ 83 98 85 71 67 60 
2005 ........................................ 121  132 91 70 68 64 
South-east  Europe-2        
1990 ........................................ 100  100 99 84 66 84 
1995 ........................................ 92  107 91 78 67 71 
2000 ........................................ 89  110 91 73 68 66 
2005 ........................................ 120  159 92 65 70 60 
Eastern  Europe-10          
1990 ........................................ 100  100 97 77 66 75 
1995 ........................................ 95  110 90 70 67 63 
2000 ........................................ 112  134 88 68 68 60 
2005 ........................................ 138  169 88 65 70 57 
Memorandum items:        
European  Union-15        
1990 ........................................ 100  100 93 70 67 65 
1995 ........................................ 106  112 90 69 67 62 
2000 ........................................ 121  120 93 71 67 66 
2005 ........................................ 128  125 92 73 67 67 
United  States        
1990 ........................................ 100  100 95 75 66 70 
1995 ........................................ 107  107 94 75 66 71 
2000 ........................................ 124  120 96 76 66 73 
2005 ........................................ 134  131 95 75 67 71 
Source:   UNECE secretariat calculations, based on data from: UNECE, stat@unece Database; UNDESA, Population Division, World Population 
Prospects: The 2004 Revision; European Commission, AMECO Database. 
Note:  Indicators: GDP – gross domestic product; Pop – total population; Emp – total employment; LF – labour force; Pop 15-64 – population aged from 
15 to 64; GDP/Pop – GDP per capita; GDP/Emp – total labour productivity; LF/Pop 15-64 – labour force participation rate; Emp/Pop 15-64 – employment rate. 
Country groupings: Central Europe – Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia; Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; South-east 
Europe-2 – Bulgaria, Romania; Eastern Europe-10 – all aforementioned 10 countries; European Union-15 – EU member states prior to the 2004 enlargement. 
Real GDP expressed at constant prices of 2000 converted into dollars using 2000 PPPs.   26 
stagnant and it was only in 2004 – i.e. 15 years after the beginning of transition – that the falling trend 
in employment started to be slightly reversed. In the event, in 2005 total employment was still one fifth 
lower than in 1990. 
Labour force participation at the onset of transition was much higher than in western Europe and 
the United States (table 11), reflecting the already mentioned labour hoarding and associated 
overemployment and the resulting virtual non-existence of open unemployment. The sharp and 
persistent decline in employment in the EE-10 resulted not only in a strong increase in unemployment, 
but also in a strong exit from the labour force on the part of discouraged workers (section B). This is 
partly reflected in a strong rise in informal sector activity.   
Unemployment started to be absorbed by net job creation since 2003, as unemployment started 
declining in all 10 countries (EE-10). The decline in labour force participation, by contrast, has been an 
even more lasting consequence of transition and it has started being reversed so far only in Hungary, 
Latvia and Slovenia (table 12). 
The rise in unemployment and the exit from the labour force led to a sharp decline in the 
employment rate in eastern Europe. For the aggregate of EE-10, the employment rate fell to just 57 per 
cent in 2005, down from 75 per cent in 1990 and 63 per cent in 1995. This rate is well below that of 
established market economies, including even that of the EU-15 (table11). The much lower 
employment rates of the EE-10 are due mainly to lower labour force participation rates (table 12).  
The poor performance of labour markets in eastern Europe since 1990 has negated the potentially 
favourable demographic development that resulted in a rising working age population as a proportion 
of total population. This trend was common to the three subregions of eastern Europe and could 
potentially have raised labour supply and could thus have contributed to even stronger GDP growth. 
During the same period this ratio remained constant in the EU-15 and the United States (table 11).  
Among the subregions of eastern Europe, the five central European countries (CE-5) achieved, on 
average, similar gains in productivity and real per capita incomes as the aggregate of EE-10 (table 12). This 
reflects the fact that the CE-5 account for the bulk of output and employment in the aggregate of the EE-10.  
Developments in the CE-5 were driven by Poland, the largest economy in eastern Europe. Labour 
productivity almost doubled from 1990 to 2005, while real per capita incomes rose by 67 per cent over 
this period. The sizeable growth gap between these two variables is entirely due to the sharp fall of the 
employment rate, which amounted to only 51 per cent in 2005, the lowest in the region, and down 
from 66 per cent in 1990 (table 12). The general pattern of relative changes in productivity and real 
incomes is broadly similar in the other four central European countries. It is noteworthy that 
productivity gains were much smaller in the Czech Republic compared with the other countries, with a 
concomitantly smaller increase in real per capita income. This reflects to a large extent a more 
moderate rate of economic expansion, as its average annual GDP growth rate in 1995-2005 was at 
least 1.5 percentage points lower than that of the other CE-5 countries.  
Among all east European countries, the Baltic states experienced the strongest variations in their 
output and productivity performance since 1990. At the same time, their labour market performance also 
diverged significantly from that of the other subregions. A slump in real GDP by some 40 per cent 
during the first half of the 1990s was accompanied by an equally sharp fall in labour productivity of 
nearly 30 per cent, given the only partial adjustment of labour input during the transformational 
recession. At the same time, real per capita income also fell sharply by about one third (table 11). But 
since the mid-1990s, the economies in the subregion have been on a solid upward trend, combining 
favourable gains in productivity with an improved labour market performance. The rate of exit from the 
labour force since 1990 was the lowest among the three subregions and the acceleration of economic 
growth since 2000 entailed robust job creation. The employment rate edged up from 60 per cent in 2000 
to 64 per cent in 2005, almost 10 percentage points above the CE-5, although still somewhat lower than 
in the EU-15 (table 11).  Against this background, labour productivity gains by 80 per cent between 1995 
and 2005 translated into a sizeable rise in real incomes per capita by more than 90 per cent over the same 
period. Still, because of the sharp initial slump, its productivity in 2005 was just one third above the 1990 
level and real incomes were only some 20 per cent higher than at the onset of transition.  27 
TABLE 12 
Per capita GDP in eastern Europe: the role of productivity, labour market performance and the demographic structure, 1990-2005 
(individual countries) 
  GDP/Pop  GDP/Emp  Emp/LF  LF/Pop 15-64  Pop 15-64/Pop 
Memorandum item:  
Emp/Pop 15-64 
  Indices, 1990=100  Ratios (per cent) 
Bulgaria        
1990 ........................................ 100  100 88 89 83 88 
1995 ........................................ 92  112 90 60 67 54 
2000 ........................................ 92  115 83 62 68 51 
2005 ........................................ 120  136 89 62 69 56 
Czech  Republic        
1990 ........................................ 100  100 99 80 66 79 
1995 ........................................ 95  103 97 73 68 70 
2000 ........................................ 103  116 91 72 70 66 
2005 ........................................ 121  135 92 71 71 65 
Estonia        
1990 ........................................ 100  100 99 79 66 79 
1995 ........................................ 80 95 90 74 66 67 
2000 ........................................ 110  137 88 71 67 63 
2005 ........................................ 158  181 93 72 68 66 
Hungary          
1990 ........................................ 100  100  100 74 66 73 
1995 ........................................ 89  122 90 58 68 53 
2000 ........................................ 109  142 94 59 68 55 
2005 ........................................ 133  168 93 60 69 56 
Latvia        
1990 ........................................ 100  100  100 73 67 73 
1995 ........................................ 58 72 86 70 66 60 
2000 ........................................ 79 96 86 69 67 59 
2005 ........................................ 117  127 90 72 68 65 
Lithuania        
1990 ........................................ 100  100 95 72 67 68 
1995 ........................................ 60 67 87 71 66 62 
2000 ........................................ 77 86 83 72 66 60 
2005 ........................................ 112  119 91 69 68 63 
Poland        
1990 ........................................ 100  100 94 70 65 66 
1995 ........................................ 110  123 87 67 66 58 
2000 ........................................ 143  163 84 65 69 55 
2005 ........................................ 167  198 82 62 71 51 
Romania        
1990 ........................................ 100  100 99 91 66 90 
1995 ........................................ 92  106 91 84 68 77 
2000 ........................................ 88  108 93 77 68 71 
2005 ........................................ 120  167 93 66 70 61 
Slovakia        
1990 ........................................ 100  100 99 76 64 75 
1995 ........................................ 85  103 88 69 67 60 
2000 ........................................ 101  126 81 69 69 56 
2005 ........................................ 127  150 83 69 71 57 
S l o v e n i a         
1990 ........................................ 100  100 97 84 68 81 
1995 ........................................ 95  118 93 69 69 65 
2000 ........................................ 118  143 93 70 70 65 
2005 ........................................ 139  160 94 72 70 68 
Source:  As in table 11. 
Note:  Indicators: as in table 11.  Real GDP expressed at constant prices of 2000 converted into dollars using 2000 PPPs.   28 
        In SEE-2 (Bulgaria and Romania), the process of economic reforms started in earnest only in the 
late 1990s. This contributed to a surge in productivity by, on average, some 45 per cent between 2000 
and 2005. Real income per capita was on a declining trend between 1990 and 2000, but increased by 
35 per cent in the next five years (table 11). It is noteworthy that the average favourable labour 
productivity growth during 2000-2005 reflects mainly developments in Romania, where there was an 
increase by some 55 per cent compared to only 19 per cent in Bulgaria (table 12). In Bulgaria, a rise in 
the employment rate actually entailed that growth of real income per capita exceeded labour 
productivity growth over this period. This contrasts with Romania, where a sharp fall in the 
employment rate significantly dampened growth in real per capita income relative to labour 
productivity.  
Performance relative to the United States and the EU-15 
The decomposition of the changes in real GDP per capita (equation 2 above) can also be used to 
analyse the relative effects of these factors on the progress in real convergence to performance levels 
in economically more advanced economies.  
Tables 13 to 16 show that the limited progress in closing the sizeable real income gap with the 
United States and the EU-15 masks a much more favourable catch up as regards average labour 
productivity levels. Whereas real income per capita in eastern Europe-10 corresponded to only 32 
per cent of United States levels in 2005, average relative labour productivity was much higher at 38 
per cent. This gap reflects the much lower employment rate compared to the United States, which is 
only partly offset by the effect of a higher ratio of population at working age to total population 
(table 17).  
TABLE 13 
Per capita GDP in eastern Europe: the role of productivity, labour market performance and the demographic structure, 1990-2005 
(main country groupings) 
(Benchmark: United States=100) 
  GDP/Pop  GDP/Emp  Emp/LF  LF/Pop 15-64  Pop 15-64/Pop 
Memorandum item: 
Emp/Pop 15-64 
Central  Europe        
1990 ........................................ 34 34  102 98 99  100 
1995 ........................................ 31 37 94 89  102 84 
2000 ........................................ 33 41 90 87  104 78 
2005 ........................................ 36 44 91 86  105 78 
Baltic  states        
1990 ........................................ 37 36  103 99  101  102 
1995 ........................................ 22 25 93 95  100 88 
2000 ........................................ 25 30 89 93  101 83 
2005 ........................................ 34 37 96 94  102 90 
South-east  Europe-2        
1990 ........................................ 24  20 105 113 100 119 
1995 ........................................ 20  20  96 104 103 100 
2000 ........................................ 17 18 95 96  103 91 
2005 ........................................ 21 24 97 87  104 84 
Eastern  Europe-10          
1990 ........................................ 31  29 103 103 100 106 
1995 ........................................ 27 30 95 94  102 89 
2000 ........................................ 28 33 91 90  104 82 
2005 ........................................ 32 38 93 86  105 80 
Memorandum item:        
European  Union-15        
1990 ........................................ 75 80 98 94  102 92 
1995 ........................................ 74 83 96 92  102 87 
2000 ........................................ 72 80 96 93  101 90 
2005 ........................................ 71 76 97 97  100 94 
Source:  As in table 11.  
Note:  As in table 11. 29 
TABLE 14 
Per capita GDP in eastern Europe: the role of productivity, labour market performance and the demographic structure, 1990-2005 
(individual countries) 
(Benchmark: United States=100) 
  GDP/Pop  GDP/Emp  Emp/LF  LF/Pop 15-64  Pop 15-64/Pop 
Memorandum item: 
Emp/Pop 15-64 
Bulgaria        
1990 ........................................ 24 26  105 89  101 93 
1995 ........................................ 21 27 95 80  102 76 
2000 ........................................ 18 25 87 81  103 71 
2005 ........................................ 22 27 94 83  104 78 
Czech  Republic        
1990 ........................................ 51  45 105 107 100 112 
1995 ........................................ 45 44  102 97  104  100 
2000 ........................................ 42 44 95 95  106 91 
2005 ........................................ 46 47 97 95  106 92 
Estonia        
1990 ........................................ 31  27 105 106 101 112 
1995 ........................................ 23 24 96 99  100 94 
2000 ........................................ 27 31 91 94  101 86 
2005 ........................................ 36 38 98 96  102 94 
Hungary          
1990 ........................................ 39 38  105 99  101  104 
1995 ........................................ 33 43 96 78  103 74 
2000 ........................................ 35 44 98 77  103 76 
2005 ........................................ 39 48 98 80  103 79 
Latvia        
1990 ........................................ 36 35  105 98  101  103 
1995 ........................................ 20 23 91 93  100 84 
2000 ........................................ 23 28 90 91  101 81 
2005 ........................................ 31 34 95 96  102 92 
Lithuania        
1990 ........................................ 41 42  100 96  101 96 
1995 ........................................ 23 26 92 94  101 87 
2000 ........................................ 25 30 87 95  100 83 
2005 ........................................ 34 38 96 92  101 88 
Poland        
1990 ........................................ 26 28 99 95 98 94 
1995 ........................................ 27 32 92 89  101 82 
2000 ........................................ 30 38 87 86  104 75 
2005 ........................................ 32 42 87 83  106 72 
Romania        
1990 ........................................ 23  18 104 123 100 128 
1995 ........................................ 20  18  96 112 103 108 
2000 ........................................ 17 17 97  101  103 98 
2005 ........................................ 21 23 98 88  104 86 
Slovakia        
1990 ........................................ 38  37 104 102  98 107 
1995 ........................................ 30 35 93 92  102 85 
2000 ........................................ 31 39 85 91  104 77 
2005 ........................................ 36 42 88 92  107 80 
S l o v e n i a         
1990 ........................................ 51  43 103 112 103 116 
1995 ........................................ 46 47 99 93  106 91 
2000 ........................................ 49 51 97 92  106 90 
2005 ........................................ 53 52 99 97  105 96 
Source:  As in table 11. 
Note:  As in table 12.   
 30 
        The discrepancy between the productivity gap and the real income gap is more pronounced for 
the CE-5, where average labour productivity corresponds now to 44 per cent of United States levels 
(up from 34 per cent in 1990) whereas the real income gap narrowed only marginally to 36 per cent of 
United States levels, still quite close to 34 per cent in 1990. The dominating explanatory factor remains 
the lower employment rate (table 17).   
The gaps between relative productivity levels and real per capita income levels are smaller in the 
case of the Baltic states and in SEE-2, but also in these cases the discrepancy stems mainly from the 
low labour force participation rate (table 17).  
A similar pattern prevails for comparisons with the EU-15 (tables 15, 16 and 18).  
In summary, our analysis suggests that while productivity developments are largely technology 
driven and dependent on the accumulation of physical and human capital, R&D and innovation 
activities, macroeconomic stability, etc., the labour market performance can be improved by a specific 
set of policies aiming at creating better incentives for companies to hire new workers as well as 
establishing an education and training system that endows the workforce with adequate skills, 
especially those that are required to absorb innovation developed in more advanced economies. The 
absorption of more of the labour force into productive employment as well as the reversal of the fall in 
labour force participation can also be promoted by means of active labour market policies.  
D.  Total factor productivity 
One of the key handicaps of the central planned economy was the built-in inefficiency of the system 
of central planning: the endemic distortions rooted in the administrative setting of prices and the arbitrary 
allocation of resources coupled with the lack of proper incentives translated into inefficient resource 
TABLE 15 
Per capita GDP in eastern Europe: the role of productivity, labour market performance and the demographic structure, 1990-2005 
(individual countries) 
(Benchmark: EU-15=100) 
  GDP/Pop  GDP/Emp  Emp/LF  LF/Pop 15-64  Pop 15-64/Pop 
Memorandum item: 
Emp/Pop 15-64 
Central  Europe        
1990 ........................................ 45  43 104 105  97 109 
1995 ........................................ 42 44 99 97 97 96 
2000 ........................................ 46 51 93 93  103 87 
2005 ........................................ 51 59 93 88  106 82 
Baltic  states        
1990 ........................................ 50  46 105 105  99 110 
1995 ........................................ 29  30  97 104  99 100 
2000 ........................................ 34 37 92  100  100 92 
2005 ........................................ 47 48 99 97  102 96 
South-east  Europe-2        
1990 ........................................ 32  25 107 121  99 129 
1995 ........................................ 27  24 101 113  99 114 
2000 ........................................ 24  23  98 102 102 101 
2005 ........................................ 30 32  100 89  105 89 
Eastern  Europe-10          
1990 ........................................ 41  37 105 110  98 115 
1995 ........................................ 37  36  99 103  98 102 
2000 ........................................ 38 41 95 96  102 91 
2005 ........................................ 45 50 96 89  105 85 
Memorandum item:        
United  States        
1990 ........................................ 134 126 102 106  98 109 
1995 ........................................ 135 121 105 109  98 114 
2000 ........................................ 138 126 104 107  99 111 
2005 ........................................ 140 132 103 103 100 106 
Source:  As in table 11. 
Note:  As in table 11.  
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TABLE 16 
Per capita GDP in eastern Europe: the role of productivity, labour market performance and the demographic structure, 1990-2005 
(individual countries) 
(Benchmark: EU-15 =100) 
  GDP/Pop  GDP/Emp  Emp/LF  LF/Pop 15-64  Pop 15-64/Pop 
Memorandum item: 
Emp/Pop 15-64 
Bulgaria        
1990 ........................................ 33 32  107 95 99  101 
1995 ........................................ 28 32 99 87 99 87 
2000 ........................................ 25 31 90 87  102 78 
2005 ........................................ 30 35 97 86  104 83 
Czech  Republic        
1990 ........................................ 68  57 107 114  98 122 
1995 ........................................ 61  53 107 106  98 114 
2000 ........................................ 58  55  99 102 104 101 
2005 ........................................ 64 62  100 98  107 98 
Estonia        
1990 ........................................ 41  34 107 113  99 121 
1995 ........................................ 31  29 100 108  99 108 
2000 ........................................ 38 39 95  101  100 95 
2005 ........................................ 50 50  101 99  102 99 
Hungary          
1990 ........................................ 53  47 107 105  99 113 
1995 ........................................ 44 51  100 85 99 85 
2000 ........................................ 48 56  101 83  102 84 
2005 ........................................ 55 64  101 83  104 83 
Latvia        
1990 ........................................ 49  44 107 104  99 112 
1995 ........................................ 26 28 95  101 99 96 
2000 ........................................ 32 35 93 97  100 90 
2005 ........................................ 44 44 98 99  103 97 
Lithuania        
1990 ........................................ 55  53 102 102  99 104 
1995 ........................................ 31  32  97 103  99 100 
2000 ........................................ 35 38 90  102 99 92 
2005 ........................................ 48 50 99 95  102 94 
Poland        
1990 ........................................ 35  35 101 101  97 102 
1995 ........................................ 36 39 96 98 97 94 
2000 ........................................ 41 48 90 92  103 83 
2005 ........................................ 45 56 89 86  106 76 
Romania        
1990 ........................................ 31  23 107 131  98 139 
1995 ........................................ 27  22 101 123  98 124 
2000 ........................................ 23  21 101 108 102 109 
2005 ........................................ 30 31  101 91  105 92 
Slovakia        
1990 ........................................ 51  46 106 109  96 116 
1995 ........................................ 41 42 97  100 96 97 
2000 ........................................ 43 48 88 98  103 86 
2005 ........................................ 51 56 90 94  107 85 
S l o v e n i a         
1990 ........................................ 69  54 105 120 101 125 
1995 ........................................ 62  57 103 101 101 104 
2000 ........................................ 67 64  101 99  105  100 
2005 ........................................ 75  69 102 100 106 102 
Source:  As in table 11. 
Note:  As in table 12.   
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TABLE 17 
Labour productivity and the effects of labour force utilization and demographic structure on per capita GDP  
(Benchmark: United States) 
      Effects of:     
  GDP/Emp  Emp/LF  LF/Pop 15-64  Pop 15-64/Pop  GDP per capita 
  (United States=100)  (Percentage point contributions)  (United States=100) 
Central  Europe       
1990 .......................................... 34 +1  -1  – 34 
1995 .......................................... 37 -2 -4  +1 31 
2000 .......................................... 41 -4 -5  +1 33 
2005 .......................................... 44 -4 -6  +2 36 
Baltic  states       
1990 .......................................... 36 +1  -1  – 37 
1995 .......................................... 25 -2 -1  +1 22 
2000 .......................................... 30 -3 -2  – 25 
2005 .......................................... 37 -1 -2  +1 34 
South-east  Europe-2       
1990 .......................................... 20 +1 +3  – 24 
1995 .......................................... 20 -1  +1  – 20 
2000 .......................................... 18 -1 -1  +1 17 
2005 .......................................... 24 -1 -3  +1 21 
Eastern  Europe-10         
1990 .......................................... 29 +1 +1  – 31 
1995 .......................................... 30 -2 -2  +1 27 
2000 .......................................... 33 -3 -3  +1 28 
2005 .......................................... 38 -3 -5  +1 32 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on the data presented in table 13. 
Note:  As in table 11.  
TABLE 18 
Labour productivity and the effects of labour force utilization and demographic structure on per capita GDP  
(Benchmark: EU-15) 
      Effects of:     
  GDP/Emp  Emp/LF  LF/Pop 15-64  Pop 15-64/Pop  GDP per capita 
  (EU-15=100)  (Percentage point contributions)  (EU-15=100) 
Central  Europe       
1990 .......................................... 43 +2 +2 -1 45 
1995 .......................................... 44 –  -1 –  42 
2000 .......................................... 51 -3 -3  +1 46 
2005 .......................................... 59 -4 -6  +3 51 
Baltic  states       
1990 .......................................... 46 +2 +2  – 50 
1995 .......................................... 30 -1  +1 -1 29 
2000 .......................................... 37 -3  –  – 34 
2005 .......................................... 48 -1 -1  +1 47 
South-east  Europe-2       
1990 .......................................... 25 +2 +6  – 32 
1995 .......................................... 24 –  +3 –  27 
2000 .......................................... 23 –  +1 –  24 
2005 .......................................... 32 –  -3  +1  30 
Eastern  Europe-10       
1990 .......................................... 37 +2 +4 -1 41 
1995 .......................................... 36 –  +1 –  37 
2000 .......................................... 41 -2 -1  +1 38 
2005 .......................................... 50 -2 -5  +2 45 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on the data presented in table 15. 
Note:  As in table 11.  
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allocation and suboptimal economic performance. Thus one of the key policy objectives of the reform 
process was to improve resource allocation and raise productive efficiency by establishing well 
functioning market mechanisms and institutions. Rising productivity and productive efficiency are also 
the fundament for achieving sustainable and high rates of long-run economic growth and catching up 
with the more developed industrialized economies. 
The analysis in the previous section provides useful insights in the role of labour productivity and 
labour utilization as important factors behind the evolution of GDP per capita in eastern Europe since 
1990. But labour productivity growth can, in turn, be explained by the dynamics of other factors such 
as, for example, capital intensity and total factor productivity (TFP). The concept of TFP was 
developed in a neoclassical growth accounting framework by Solow using a standard two-factor input 
production function. Later this concept was developed and elaborated in various directions.
34 Despite 
the differences, most of the approaches based on the notion of TFP seek to distinguish between the 
variation in output which is caused by variation in factor inputs and those changes in the level of 
output that are assumed to be attributed to the efficiency of resource transformation per se, i.e. the 
efficiency of the underlying production technology. Hence TFP growth corresponds to the change in 
output that cannot be directly allocated to factor input accumulation.
35 The objective is then to fit a 
production function on the observed data and to filter out the above two components of output 
variation.  
The traditional growth accounting techniques rely on a two-factor production function (based on 
labour and capital inputs). In this approach all variations in output unrelated to the changes in the 
product mix of these two factors are reflected in the estimated residual and are thus attributed to 
changes in productive efficiency (TFP). Some of the more recent growth accounting techniques 
employ more elaborate specifications of the underlying production technology, including additional 
production factors (apart from the traditional capital and labour), such as, for example, factors 
reflecting human capital endowments. Including additional factor inputs makes it possible to explain 
directly a larger share of the productivity changes as some of the otherwise unexplained variation in 
productivity (that remains part of the residual TFP in the two-factor production function) is attributed 
to these factors.  
Moreover, the traditional growth accounting approach has been to assume a pre-determined 
functional form for the production technology, in which total factor productivity is usually treated as a 
separable factor and to estimate this function as the best fit on the observed data. Relatively recently, 
with the elaboration of more sophisticated econometric approaches, the focus of research has shifted to 
the attempts to estimate production frontiers expressing the “best practice”, or the maximum amount of 
output obtainable with a given technology from a given mix of input quantities. While the traditional 
growth accounting techniques identify TFP with the residual of the estimated production function, 
these techniques allow to distinguish between the components of the productivity dynamics such as 
technical efficiency and technological change.
36 
The applicability of growth-accounting techniques is dependent on the availability of reliable 
statistics on output and factor inputs. With reference to the east European and CIS economies, this 
poses serious constraints as to the applicability of some of these methods, and in effect prevents the 
application of more elaborate approaches, including those comprising multiple production factors. For 
                                                   
34  R. Solow, “Technical change and the aggregate production function”, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 39, No. 3 
(1957), pp. 525-551. For an overview of the evolution of the notion of TFP see C. Hulten, “Total factor productivity: a 
short biography”, NBER Working Paper No. W7471, January 2000; for a comparative survey of the different approaches 
in international TFP comparisons see N. Islam, “International comparison of total factor productivity: a review”, Review 
of Income and Wealth, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1999, pp. 493-518.  
35  In this framework, TFP growth reflects the cumulative outcome of two underlying developments: change in productive 
efficiency per se and technological change.  
36  Such an approach is used by A. Krüger, U. Cantner and H. Hanusch (“Total factor productivity, the East Asian miracle, 
and the world production frontier”, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 136, No. 1, 2000, pp. 111-136) who estimate a 
“world production frontier” and evaluate the distance of individual economies from this frontier. 34 
the purpose of sketching a rough picture of the TFP dynamics in eastern Europe and the CIS during the 
transition from plan to market we have performed a tentative growth accounting exercise for several of 
these countries based on a traditional two-factor production function. In view of the data problems 
mentioned above, our approach was limited to the traditional measure of TFP, the Solow residual.  
Solow’s approach is based on a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale 
and autonomous and neutral technical change. The parameters of the production function are determined 
under the assumptions of profit maximizing behaviour and perfect markets which yield the well known 
condition of equality between factor prices and the marginal productivity of production factors.
37 
Output is defined as real GDP and the factors are the inputs of labour and capital services. In this case 
the Solow residuals sj (denoting the rate of change of TFP in country j at time t) are defined as: 
sj (t) = d yj (t) – α d lj (t) – (1– α ) d kj (t)  (3) 
where α is the share of labour income in nominal gross value added; d yj , d lj and d kj are the 
logarithmic differences of real GDP, real labour input and real capital input at time t, respectively. 
An essential data requirement for implementing this approach is statistics on the primary 
distribution of income in the economy for the compensation of labour and capital. In the SNA 
framework, this corresponds to the breakdown of aggregate value added produced in the economy at 
factor costs (i.e. net of the item “indirect taxes less subsidies”) into “compensation of employees” 
(labour income) and “gross operating surplus and gross mixed income” (capital income).
38 Table 19 
presents the data on the primary distribution of income in the economy for some of these countries 
where relevant data are available for a sufficiently long period of time. 
Another key data requirement is statistics on the inputs of labour and capital services. The 
relevant measure for labour input is the aggregate number of hours worked in the economy. However, 
due to the lack of such statistics for most of the east European and CIS countries we have used as a 
proxy the total number of persons employed in the economy.  
The most problematic variable in applying any method of growth accounting is the input of capital 
services. No generally accepted statistical methodology exists for measuring the input of capital services, 
so empirical applications are usually based on proxies. Among the most commonly used proxy for 
capital services is the stock of productive/fixed capital in the economy. Even this variable is often 
problematic due to the absence of reliable estimates of the stock. It should be noted that the measurement 
of fixed capital stock is a general problem not only for the east European and CIS economies but also in 
industrialized countries. However, the problems are especially acute in the former centrally planned 
economies where statistical offices only recently started practical work in this area.  
The most widely used method for measuring the fixed capital stock is the so-called “perpetual 
inventory method” based on the well known dynamic equation of capital accumulation:
 39  
Fixed capital(t) = Fixed capital(t-1) – depreciation(t) + fixed investment(t)  (4) 
It has been shown that if one starts from a reasonable level of the capital-output ratio in the initial 
year and applies consistently the perpetual inventory method over a sufficiently long period of time, 
this method provides reasonable estimates for the dynamics of the fixed capital stock in later years. 
This is the empirical rationale behind the application of the perpetual inventory method for estimating 
proxies of the fixed capital stock. 
                                                   
37  Admittedly, these may be considered as rather strong assumptions for countries undergoing transformation from plan to 
market. However, the empirical experience shows that deviations from these assumptions do not result in major changes 
in the estimated TFP. 
38  Note that these should be considered as proxies for the true values of factor remuneration due to some methodological 
specificities of SNA (for example the fact that the income of self-employed persons is included in the “mixed income” 
category). 
39  M. Mas, F. Perez and E. Uriel, “Estimation of the stock of capital in Spain”, Review of Income and Wealth, Vol. 46, 2000, 
pp. 103-116. It is usually applied at lower levels of disaggregation and by differentiating between types of physical capital 
which then serves as the basis for deriving estimates of the aggregate stock of capital. 35 
In our case we have computed long-term series for the fixed capital stock dynamics 
(understandably, rough estimates) in some of the east European and CIS countries by applying this 
method for a period of several decades starting in 1950.
40 For this purpose we use historic series of 
fixed investment (fixed investment ratios defined as the share of gross fixed capital formation in 
GDP) in these economies (before 1989, the former centrally planned economies)
41 as well as the 
results of the International Comparison Programmes, which provide internationally comparable 
GDP estimates at PPPs (table 6). The actual computation procedure was designed as follows. We 
start by computing long-term series (going back to 1950) for GDP in internationally comparable 
constant prices.
42 Then for the year 1950 we assume a reasonable value for the capital to GDP 
ratio
43 and compute the real stock of fixed capital for the years that follow through the dynamic 
equation of capital accumulation (4). The value of real fixed investment is determined by applying 
the fixed investment ratios
44 to the corresponding levels of real GDP (both GDP and the stock of 
real capital are measured in constant international dollars), while for depreciation we have used 
norms suggested in the literature.
45  
                                                   
40  The choice of 1950 as a starting year was based on the availability of appropriate statistical data. 
41  The historic investment ratios have been taken from various issues of Economic Survey of Europe published by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe. The investment ratios of the then existing states (Czechoslovakia, the USSR 
and Yugoslavia) have been used for the countries that succeeded them. 
42  It is well known that the officially reported growth rates for the centrally planned economies were highly inflated. For this 
purpose we have used the estimates of the long-run GDP growth rates in the former centrally planned economies for the 
period prior to 1990 reported in section II to back-cast the dynamics of real GDP to the year 1950. The growth rates of 
Czechoslovakia, USSR and Yugoslavia have been used as proxies for the past GDP dynamics in the countries that 
succeeded them. 
43  The actual ratios vary between 1.5 and 2.5 and reflect: i) the historic differences in per capita income levels and ii) the 
investment ratios in countries with similar per capita income levels. 
44 We used investment ratios in current prices and applied them to real GDP series. This is equivalent to the additional 
assumption that the price deflators of GDP and gross fixed capital formation were identical. 
45 For example, Hulten and Wykoff suggest the following rates of capital consumption for the United States economy: 
0.0361 for buildings and 0.1179 for machinery and equipment (C. Hulten and F. Wykoff, “The estimation of economic 
depreciation using vintage asset prices: an application of the Box-Cox power transformation”, Journal of Econometrics, 
Vol. 15, No. 3, 1981, pp. 367-396). Mas, Perez and Uriel, op. cit., come up with comparable numbers for Spain. For the 
purpose of our exercise an average rate of capital consumption of 0.085 (for the total economy) has been used for the east 
European and CIS economies. 
TABLE 19 
Primary distribution of value added in selected east European and CIS economies, 1990-2003 
(Period averages, per cent) 
  Labour income a  Capital income b 
  1990-1994  1995-1999  2000-2003  1990-2003  1995-2003  1990-1994  1995-1999  2000-2003  1990-2003  1995-2003 
Bulgaria .......................... 55.0  42.6 38.7 45.9 40.8 45.0 57.4 61.3 54.1 59.2 
Croatia ........................... 41.3 52.0 46.6 53.7 48.7 58.7 48.0 53.4 46.3 51.3 
Czech Republic .............. 49.7 51.2 50.4 47.9 49.7 50.3 48.8 49.6 52.1 50.3 
Estonia ........................... 57.5 57.5 52.9 56.2 55.4 42.5 42.5 47.1 43.8 44.6 
Hungary ......................... 66.5 53.0 59.7 53.1 57.8 33.5 47.0 40.3 46.9 42.2 
Latvia ............................. 48.6 55.1 51.8 45.1 49.9 51.4 44.9 48.2 54.9 50.1 
Lithuania ........................ 47.1  48.7 47.9 44.0 46.8 52.9 51.3 52.1 56.0 53.2 
Poland ............................ 47.2  49.2 48.2 49.1 48.5 52.8 50.8 51.8 50.9 51.5 
Romania ........................ 44.8 38.7 41.8 45.8 42.9 55.2 61.3 58.2 54.2 57.1 
Slovakia ......................... 46.6 47.9 47.3 45.3 46.7 53.4 52.1 52.7 54.7 53.3 
Slovenia ......................... 69.8 62.8 66.3 62.1 65.1 30.2 37.2 33.7 37.9 34.9 
Russian Federation ........ 50.3 55.2 52.8 53.0 52.8 49.7 44.8 47.2 47.0 47.2 
Ukraine .......................... 51.2 57.1 54.1 50.8 53.2 48.8 42.9 45.9 49.2 46.8 
Source:  UNECE secretariat calculations, based on national statistics. 
a  Share of compensation of employees in aggregate value added net of indirect taxes and subsidies. 
b  Share of gross operating surplus and mixed income in aggregate value added net of indirect taxes and subsidies. 36 
The results for the estimated average Solow residuals in several east European and CIS countries 
(a measure of the rate of change of their TFP), as well as the corresponding contributions of capital 
and labour inputs to GDP growth, are shown in table 20. These results shed some additional light on 
the effect of different factors, including the changes in TFP in explaining the variation in growth 
performance during the transition from plan to market.  
Probably the most interesting insight concerns the differences in the composition of growth 
factors during the transformational recession, on the one hand, and those during the post-recession 
recovery, on the other. The transformational recession was in most east European and CIS countries a 
sweeping growth crisis, in which the two main factor inputs and the aggregate productive efficiency 
contributed negatively to GDP growth. As noted in the previous sections, this was a period of sharply 
falling employment and dramatic contraction in investment, reflected in most cases in negative factor 
contributions to the growth of aggregate output (in some cases the drop in labour input accounted for 
the largest share of the drop in the GDP growth rates). The period of transformational recession was in 
most cases also accompanied by a sharp drop in TFP, largely reflecting the disorganization and 
institutional hiatus that prevailed in the first phase of transition (the exceptions being Hungary, Poland 
and Slovenia).
46 
In contrast, the single most important factor contributing to the speed of post-recession recovery 
was the sharp rise in TFP during the later phases of transition. Moreover, in a number of countries, the 
average annual rise in TFP during the period 2000-2003 (and in many cases also during the period 
1995-1999) was higher than the corresponding average annual rate of GDP growth. As already 
discussed, the process of enterprise restructuring and the accompanying relocation of resources (both 
capital and labour) was still underway during the later phases of transition, and the productivity-
enhancing rationalization of production sometimes involved declining contributions of factor inputs. 
At the same time, capital accumulation in this period contributed to positive technological change, 
with new investment going into modern and highly productive capital equipment. Therefore, the 
positive growth in TFP likely reflected a combination of rising productive efficiency and technological 
change. Thus, while this process of economic restructuring undoubtedly involved a painful adjustment, 
especially in the labour market, the positive outcome has been a dramatic rise in overall productivity. 
Admittedly, the reliability of the TFP estimates hinges to a large degree on the reliability of the 
estimated dynamics of the fixed capital stock. In our case, apart from the rough and approximate 
nature of the perpetual inventory method itself, there is another factor that needs to be taken into 
consideration, namely the knock-on effect of transition on the value of physical capital in the east 
European and CIS economies. As argued above, as a result of the disbanding of the CMEA market 
(that absorbed a large share of these countries’ exports) and the abrupt exposure to the competitive 
pressures of international goods markets, the former CPEs suddenly were faced with a huge stock of 
sunk capital that was inoperative under market conditions. This erosion of the value of the available 
fixed capital stock was a de facto equivalent to a one-off write-off of a corresponding share of the 
stock.  
There have been no systematic attempts to evaluate the magnitude of such a knock-on effect on 
the basis of actual empirical data. For the purpose of checking the sensitivity of the TFP results, we 
performed a simplified experiment by incorporating a one-off write-off effect in the year 1990. In 
practical terms, this can be emulated in the dynamic equation of capital accumulation (4) by 
subtracting a corresponding portion(s) of the fixed capital stock at a relevant point(s) in time. The 
actual level of the write-off was assumed to be 20 per cent of the 1989 fixed capital stock for the 
central European countries and 30 per cent of the stock for the south-east European economies and the 
successor states of the Soviet Union. The corresponding results for the resultant TFP growth are 
presented in table 21. 
                                                   
46 In these three countries, the average rate of TFP growth was positive both in the three subperiods and for the period of 











Total factor productivity and contributions of factor inputs to GDP growth in selected east European and CIS economies, 1990-2003 
(Average annual rates of change, per cent) 
    Contribution of:  Contribution of: 
  GDP, of which:  Labour  Capital 
Total factor 
productivity  GDP, of which  Labour  Capital 
Total factor 
productivity 
  1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003 1990-2003 1995-2003 1990-2003 1995-2003 1990-2003 1995-2003 1990-2003 1995-2003 
Bulgaria ...................... -4.9 -1.2  4.7 -3.0 -0.4  0.3 -1.4 -2.1 -0.2 -0.5  1.3 4.6  -0.8 1.4  -1.1  -0.1 -1.3 -1.2  1.6  2.8 
Croatia ........................ -8.4 4.2 4.2  -2.3  -0.4 0.3  -2.6 0.0 1.1  -3.6 4.6 2.9  -0.3 4.2  -0.9  -0.1  -0.6 0.5 1.2 3.8 
Czech Republic .......... -2.2 1.9 2.8  -0.9  -0.3  -0.1 0.4 0.9 0.6  -1.7 1.3 2.3 0.7 2.3  -0.4  -0.2 0.6 0.8 0.5 1.7 
Estonia ........................ -8.5 5.0 7.1  -2.4  -1.8 0.3  -0.8 0.1 1.1  -5.3 6.7 5.6 0.8 5.9  -1.4  -0.8 0.0 0.5 2.1 6.2 
Hungary ...................... -3.2 3.3 4.0  -4.3 0.1 0.4  -0.6 0.1 0.8 1.6 3.1 2.8 1.2 3.6  -1.4 0.3 0.0 0.4 2.5 2.9 
Latvia .......................... -10.2 3.8 7.1  -2.5  -0.4 0.4 -2.4 -1.0  1.1 -5.3  5.2 5.6  -0.2 5.3  -0.9 0.0 -0.9 -0.1  1.6  5.4 
Lithuania ..................... -11.2 4.5 6.9  -1.1  -0.3  -0.1 -1.0 -1.2 -0.6 -9.1  6.0 7.6  -0.4 5.6  -0.6  -0.2 -0.9 -0.9  1.1  6.7 
Poland ........................ -1.4 6.0 2.6  -1.5 0.6  -0.7  -1.4 0.8 0.8 1.5 4.6 2.5 2.4 4.5  -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.8 2.9 3.7 
Romania ..................... -4.4 -0.2  4.5 -0.9 -1.1 -0.9 -1.1 -0.4  0.2 -2.4  1.3 5.2  -0.3 1.9  -1.0  -1.0 -0.5 -0.1  1.1  3.0 
Slovakia ...................... -4.2 4.5 3.7  -1.4 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.2 0.7  -3.3 3.1 2.9 1.2 4.1  -0.4 0.2 0.8 0.9 0.8 3.0 
Slovenia ...................... -2.9 4.4 3.2  -3.2 0.1 0.4  -0.4 0.6 1.0 0.8 3.6 1.8 1.5 3.9  -1.0 0.2 0.4 0.8 2.1 2.8 
Russian Federation .... -8.8 -1.1  6.8 -1.5 -0.5  0.7 -0.8 -1.7 -0.9 -6.5  1.2 7.0  -1.6 2.4  -0.5 0.0 -1.1 -1.4  0.1  3.8 
Ukraine ....................... -11.9 -5.5  7.5 -1.0 -0.5  0.1 -0.7 -2.0 -1.7  -10.2 -2.9 9.0  -4.1 0.3  -0.5  -0.2 -1.4 -1.8 -2.1  2.4 
Source:  UNECE secretariat calculations. 










Alternative estimates of total factor productivity and contributions of factor inputs to GDP growth in selected east European and CIS economies, 1990-2003 
(Average annual rates of change, per cent) 
    Contribution of:  Contribution of: 
  GDP, of which:  Labour  Capital 
Total factor 
productivity  GDP, of which  Labour  Capital 
Total factor 
productivity 
  1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2003 1990-2003 1995-2003 1990-2003 1995-2003 1990-2003 1995-2003 1990-2003 1995-2003 
Bulgaria ...................... -4.9 -1.2  4.7 -3.0 -0.4  0.3 -0.5 -1.4  0.7 -1.4  0.6 3.7  -0.8 1.4  -1.1  -0.1 -0.5 -0.5  0.8  2.0 
Croatia ........................ -8.4 4.2 4.2  -2.3  -0.4 0.3  -2.0 0.7 1.5  -4.2 4.0 2.4  -0.3 4.2  -0.9  -0.1 0.0 1.1 0.6 3.3 
Czech Republic .......... -2.2 1.9 2.8  -0.9  -0.3  -0.1 1.4 1.4 0.9  -2.7 0.8 2.0 0.7 2.3  -0.4  -0.2 1.3 1.2  -0.1 1.3 
Estonia ........................ -8.5 5.0 7.1  -2.4  -1.8 0.3 0.2 0.9 1.8  -6.3 5.9 4.9 0.8 5.9  -1.4  -0.8 0.9 1.3 1.3 5.5 
Hungary ...................... -3.2 3.3 4.0  -4.3 0.1 0.4  -0.1 0.6 1.2 1.1 2.5 2.4 1.2 3.6  -1.4 0.3 0.5 0.9 2.0 2.5 
Latvia .......................... -10.2 3.8 7.1  -2.5  -0.4 0.4 -1.6 -0.2  2.0 -6.2  4.4 4.7  -0.2 5.3  -0.9 0.0  -0.1 0.8 0.7 4.5 
Lithuania ..................... -11.2 4.5 6.9  -1.1  -0.3  -0.1 0.3  -0.5 0.1  -10.4 5.3 6.9  -0.4 5.6  -0.6  -0.2 0.0  -0.2 0.2 6.0 
Poland ........................ -1.4 6.0 2.6  -1.5 0.6  -0.7  -0.8 1.5 1.2 0.9 3.9 2.1 2.4 4.5  -0.5 0.0 0.6 1.4 2.3 3.1 
Romania ..................... -4.4 -0.2  4.5 -0.9 -1.1 -0.9 0.2 0.7 0.8  -3.7 0.2 4.6  -0.3 1.9  -1.0  -1.0 0.6 0.8 0.1 2.1 
Slovakia ...................... -4.2 4.5 3.7  -1.4 0.1 0.2 1.6 1.8 1.0  -4.3 2.5 2.6 1.2 4.1  -0.4 0.2 1.5 1.4 0.1 2.5 
Slovenia ...................... -2.9 4.4 3.2  -3.2 0.1 0.4 0.0 1.1 1.4 0.3 3.1 1.5 1.5 3.9  -1.0 0.2 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.4 
Russian Federation .... -8.8 -1.1  6.8 -1.5 -0.5  0.7  0.5 -1.3 -0.4 -7.8  0.7 6.5  -1.6 2.4  -0.5 0.0 -0.4 -0.9 -0.7  3.3 
Ukraine ....................... -11.9 -5.5  7.5 -1.0 -0.5  0.1  0.4 -1.6 -1.2  -11.3 -3.3 8.5  -4.1 0.3  -0.5  -0.2 -0.8 -1.4 -2.8  1.9 
Source:  UNECE secretariat calculations. 
Note:  The average annual rates of TFP and of the contributions of labour and capital to GDP growth are calculated as the arithmetic averages for the corresponding periods. 
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Taking into account the knock-on effect of transition on the stock of productive capital does not 
change the main results and conclusions of the growth accounting exercise outlined above. However, 
this exercise adds some further nuances to our interpretation. The assumption of fixed capital erosion 
is tantamount to an increase in the productivity of the remaining capital stock for a given level of 
output. In other words, the predominantly negative contribution of capital to GDP growth during the 
transformational recession is now smaller, while the positive growth contribution during the recovery 
is now correspondingly larger. This, in turn, is mirrored in correspondingly larger negative growth 
contributions of TFP during the recession and smaller positive growth contributions during the ensuing 
recovery period. 
IV. Concluding remarks 
The empirical analysis of the long-term growth performance of the east European and CIS 
economies, however rough and tentative it may be, provides some useful insights into the key 
determinants of growth during the past five decades. The period covered in this study was one of 
turbulent change: it witnessed the rise and peak of communism in the first postwar decades, its gradual 
decay in the 1970s and 1980s and then its fall followed by the transition to democracy and market 
economy system after 1989. Given that the collapse of the system of central planning marked a major 
structural break in the long-term economic performance of the east European and CIS economies we 
take a different approach to the analysis of growth performance during these two subperiods. 
In the first part of the paper we present a broad overview of growth trends in eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union in the period between 1960 and 1989. One of the practical problems in analyzing the 
growth performance in the former CPEs is the absence of reliable data as the official growth statistics 
were systematically biased upwards. We have complied and constructed various alternative estimates, 
which systematically point to much lower growth figures in the CPEs than implied by the official 
statistics in this period. Moreover, these three decades marked three different phases in the CPEs’ 
long-term economic performance. The 1960s were still a decade of relatively strong economic growth 
in some parts of eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, following a very robust recovery during the 
1950s. During the 1960s the ongoing process of industrialization was accompanied by the reallocation 
of resources from the less productive primary sector activity to the more productive secondary sector. 
During the 1970s, economic growth slowed down considerably throughout the region but still 
remained positive. The process of extensive resource reallocation gradually came to an end while the 
built-in inefficiencies of the system of central planning surfaced in the weakening aggregate output 
growth rates. The 1980s were a period of economic regress as the CPEs plunged into a prolonged 
stagnation and, in some countries, even into recession. The highly distorted, inefficient and inflexible 
economic structures translated into technological backwardness. Besides, the CPEs turned out to be 
incapable of efficiently responding to the challenges of the major oil shocks incurred during the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
One of the key policy objectives in the process of economic transformation in the east European 
and CIS economies since the beginning of the 1990s has been to improve resource allocation, raise 
productive efficiency and achieve sustained high rates of economic growth, so as to catch up with 
standards of living of developed market economies. In the second part of the paper we examine the 
main factors of their growth performance during the transition from plan to market and assess the 
available empirical evidence on the dynamics of productivity and GDP per capita in this period.  
Ironically, the start of economic transformation in eastern Europe and the CIS was marked by a 
deep transformational recession. All these countries thus paid a heavy one-off toll for the preceding 
decades of wasteful economic performance and mismanagement. Since the mid-1990s, however, the east 
European and CIS economies have embarked on a path of strong economic growth and at present they 
are among the fastest growing regions in the world. The recovery has been accompanied by a surge in 
fixed investment, often complemented by large inflows of FDI. At the same time, there has not been – at 
least so far – a matching recovery in employment, partly an indication that labour adjustment (in the 
sense of eliminating the inherited slack of excess labour) in many of these economies is still under way.  40 
Our analysis points to a remarkable upturn in productivity in the recovery phase, both in terms of 
labour productivity and in terms of TFP. In fact, the upsurge in productive efficiency and technological 
change – triggered by the bold and wide ranging market reforms – has been the main factor behind the 
recent strong economic growth in eastern Europe and the CIS region after the end of the 
transformational recession. This is an indication that, in the main, the difficult and painful reforms in 
these countries are starting to pay off. However, in terms of real per capita income levels relative to the 
more developed, industrialized countries, these economies still face a long catching up process.  
Notwithstanding the ongoing debate in the literature related to the sources of long-term growth, 
there seems to be relatively wide agreement on the general importance of several proximate factors 
including,  inter alia: human capital development; investment in physical capital, research and 
development and infrastructural development; demographic factors (population growth); well-
organized labour markets stimulating high employment rates; efficient participation in the international 
division of labour; good governance based upon the rule of law along with appropriate regulatory 
institutions; financial systems performing efficient intermediation; a generally acceptable distribution 
of income and wealth within each country (maintaining social cohesion). Obviously, these factors 
should remain in the focus of economic policy in the eastern Europe and CIS region so as to establish 
and maintain an enabling macroeconomic and business environment for high and sustainable long run 
economic growth in these countries.   